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Commercial and subsistence fisheries provide livelihoods and fish protein to nearly three 
billion people annually. This demand has led to overfishing, which disrupts marine ecosystem 
functioning and threatens fisheries sustainability. Fisheries are some of the most challenging 
common-pool resource systems (CPRS) for which to develop effective management strategies 
because they are easily sub-tractable and non-excludable. Without effective institutions to 
regulate the extraction of the marine species, users are inclined to overharvest resources. 
Territorial User Rights for Fishing (TURFs) have recently emerged to encourage environmental 
stewardship in coastal communities by providing effective ownership of fish stocks, further 
incentivizing sustainable fishing practices. These such community-based fisheries management 
(CBFM) strategies grant fishers rights to fish in designated areas in exchange for reporting their 
catch. Belize became the first country in the Caribbean to implement a nationwide TURF 
system–known as Managed Access (MA)–in 2016, resulting from long-term collaborations 
between governmental and international fisheries agencies.  
In this dissertation, I applied Ostrom’s social-ecological systems (SES) framework to 
understanding and evaluating over forty years of marine resource management in Belize. Using 
mixed methods, I determined that marine resource management in Belize is institutionally robust 
(e.g. contains nested and decentralize enterprises), which could lead to the overcoming of 
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collective action problems often found in CPR systems. Next, I described coral reef benthic 
community structure from 21 sites across the Belize Mesoamerican Barrier Reef (BMBR) 
following several major disturbances (bleaching, storms, and disease), and attributed them to 
ocean warming and local human impacts, from 1997-2016. I found two ecologically distinct 
assemblages between early and late sampling years, significant declines in mean coral cover, and 
significant increases in macroalgae cover over ~20 years. Lastly, I conducted quantitative 
interviews of fishers from 10 communities in southern Belize in 2019 and compared their 
knowledge, attitudes and perceptions to fishers from 2014. I discovered that respondents from 
both years understand the requirements for getting and renewing MA licenses, yet perceive lack 
of enforcement as an issue to success. The results of my dissertation provide holistic, science-
based advice for sustaining fishers’ livelihoods while preserving coral reef ecosystems in a 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Marine fisheries are some of the most challenging common-pool resource systems 
(CPRS) to manage. This is because the availability of resources — such as finfish, lobster, and 
conch — is subject to unregulated extraction and overuse by other users (Olson 1965, Ostrom 
1990, Ostrom et al. 1999, Ostrom 2003). Further exacerbating this issue is the challenge of 
tracking and quantifying marine resource abundance across large and sometimes international 
oceanic boundaries (Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009, Urquhart et al. 2014, Levine and 
Richmond 2015). Overfishing of marine resources results from such un-checked extraction, 
leading to 80 – 95% reductions in large predatory fish biomass (Valdivia et al. 2015). This not 
only disrupts marine food web structure and ecosystem functioning, but also threatens invaluable 
commercial and subsistence fisheries that provide livelihoods and fish protein to nearly three 
billion people annually (FAO 2014).  
The majority of present day small-scale multi-species fisheries management relies on 
local governance and stock assessments within territorial coastal waters, which include 
monitoring catch per unit effort (CPUE), reporting maximum sustainable yield (MSY), and 
setting catch limits on target species (Valdés-Pizzini et al. 2016). Rampant overfishing in these 
fisheries led resource managers to use a variety of gear-based management strategies and 
develop catch limits to decrease additional ecosystem impacts (Jackson et al. 2001, Valdés-
Pizzini et al. 2016). Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are a common fisheries management tool 
designed to protect fish populations and promote habitat resilience. MPAs are areas within which 
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extractive fishing behaviors are restricted. Sometimes fish abundances and diversity are greater 
within well-managed, large (>100 km2), old (>10 years) and isolated MPAs, and can often 
increase and spill over into adjacent non-protected areas (Gaines et al. 2010, Edgar et al. 2014, 
Chirico et al. 2017). Fishers can reap the benefits of increased fish size and abundance by fishing 
near MPAs, their access regulated via catch share programs and fishing licenses (Gaines et al. 
2010, Anderson and Uchida 2014). However, poaching, lack of enforcement, limited spillover, 
and limited management resources often contribute to the failure of MPAs to achieve social and 
environmental objectives (Coelho 2007, Graham et al. 2008, Huntington et al. 2011, Edgar et al. 
2014, Cox et al. 2017, Gill et al. 2017). 
An established method of fisheries management, community-based fisheries management 
(CBFM), attempts to combat the aforementioned issues associated with MPAs. CBFM combines 
the understanding of fisheries – stocks, populations, and extraction methods – and the role of 
humans in shaping these techniques through culture, history, and social structure (Urquhart et al. 
2014, Valdés-Pizzini et al. 2016). CBFM offers solutions to the common pool resource problems 
associated with fisheries because it provides a platform where fishers, managers, and 
communities collaborate to reach collective objectives. Another goal of CBFM is to protect the 
integrity and function of marine ecosystems while limiting and regulating fisheries extraction 
methods (Urquhart et al. 2014, Valdés-Pizzini et al. 2016). This can be done by limiting general-
use access and implementing a licensing system, such as catch share programs for fishers (Foley 
et al. 2012, Barner et al. 2015). Catch share programs can provide a way for fishers to participate 
in local fisheries management by reporting their catch to associated fishing authorities while 
being granted “shares” of the total allowable catch (TAC) (Wiber et al. 2004, Islam and Yew 
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2013, Kittinger 2013, Alexander et al. 2015). Fisheries managers then use the data to develop 
more accurate catch limits and promote long-term sustainable fishing practices.  
Belize was the first country in the Caribbean to establish a catch share program – known 
as Managed Access (MA) – which gives fishers rights to fish in select areas but requires them to 
report their catch to management officials. The particular catch share program implemented in 
Belize is an example of a territorial user rights for fishing (TURF) regime, where fishers were 
granted rights to fish in 1-2 areas paired with marine reserves, in exchange for reporting their 
catch and color-coding their vessel(s) (Foley 2015, Belize Fisheries Department 2015, Barner 
2015, Fujita et al. 2017, Belize Fisheries Department 2019). MA was piloted in 2011 at the Port 
Honduras Marine Reserve (PHMR) and Glover's Reef Marine Reserve (GRMR), and later 
implemented nationwide in 2016, with six additional fishing sites added to Belize’s territorial 
waters (Figure 1.1) (Foley 2015, Belize Fisheries Department 2015, Barner 2015, Fujita et al. 
2017, Belize Fisheries Department 2019). This program built upon over four decades of evolving 
marine resource management in Belize and is the foundation of Belize’s new Fisheries 
Resources Bill (Belize Fisheries Department 2019). 
The purpose of my dissertation research was to apply Ostrom’s social-ecological systems 
(SES) framework (Ostrom 2007, Brondizio et al. 2009) to understanding and evaluating over 
four decades of marine resource management in Belize (Figure 1.2). The SES framework 
provides a theoretical basis to examine the interactions and outcomes of social and ecological 
variables by defining four key components: (1) the Resource System, which outlines the natural 
resource system of habitats to be managed, (2) the Governance System, which describes all of 
the entities involved in setting the rules for access and extraction within the Resource System, (3) 
the Resource Units, which are the species extracted from the Resource System and managed by 
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the Governance System, and (4) the Actors, who include the users of the Resource System and 
individuals in the Governance System (Figure 1.2) (Ostrom 2007, Brondizio et al. 2009).  
The SES framework applied to marine resource management in Belize is very complex 
(Figure 1.2). The Resource System describes the Belize Mesoamerican Barrier Reef (BMBR) 
including the variety of marine ecosystems contained within that area (seagrass beds, mangroves, 
coral reefs, lagoons, cayes, and atolls). The Governance System in Belize includes the federal 
government, comprised of the Belize Fisheries Department (BFD), The Coast Guard, Port 
Authority, and Customs, the non-governmental organization (NGO) co-managers, including the 
MA committees (i.e., representatives from fishing communities, the NGOs and the Fisheries 
Department) and the MA Working Group (MAWG). The Resource Units refer to all species 
extracted from the Resource System by the Actors, and whose regulation is determined by those 
in the Governance System. In Belize, the Resource Units are primarily lobster, conch, and finfish 
species (including snapper, Goliath grouper, snook, grunts, and barracuda). The Actors, who 
participate in the Belize MA program, include natural resource managers at the governmental 
and NGO levels, commercial fishers, scientists and academics who seek to understand the action 
situation and collaborate with most actors, and representatives from the tourism and property 
sectors. 
Each data chapter in this dissertation focuses on a different aspect of the SES framework. 
Chapter Two focuses on the Governance System of the SES framework by evaluating the 
robustness of the institutions involved in fisheries management in Belize. I first identified the 
institutional roles and structure, then examined the impact of that institutional structure on the 
decision-making power and implementation of the Managed Access program, and lastly 
determined that marine resource management in Belize exhibits Ostrom’s eight design principles 
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for long-enduring CPRS (Ostrom 1990). Chapter Three focuses on the Resource System of the 
SES framework by describing changes in coral reef assemblages at 21 sites (roughly half of the 
sites within MPAs) across the Belize Mesoamerican Barrier Reef (BMBR) following several 
major disturbances (bleaching, storms, and disease) over a 20-year period (1997-2016). I 
identified potential drivers of reef changes, including local human impacts and ocean 
temperature, and described two unique ecological assemblages between early and late sampling 
years. Chapter Four focuses on the Actors of the SES framework, by comparing the knowledge, 
attitudes and practices of fishers towards the MA program between 2014 and 2019. Fishers in 10 
communities in Southern Belize were interviewed in 2014 by the Belize Fisheries Department 
and again by me in 2019. I found that fishers overall know the rules to acquire and renew MA 
licenses, with significant increases in knowledge about the catch reporting process in 2019, but a 
lack of enforcement capacity hinders overall success.  
By examining marine resource management in Belize from a social-ecological systems 
lens, this work contributes to the growing peer-reviewed literature about community-based 
fisheries management efficacy across the globe. Including fishers in the participatory process of 
fisheries management can lead to long-term sustainability goals for their livelihoods and the 
ecosystem on a whole (Fujita et al. 2017, Karr et al. 2017, Mcdonald et al. 2017). Lessons 
learned from this dissertation can be applied to improving small-scale fisheries management 





Figure 1. 1: Managed Access fishing areas in Belize. The polygons represent MPAs. The two 
pilot sites established in 2011 were: Area 5 (in red), the Port Honduras Marine Reserve (PHMR), 
and Area 8 (in grey), the Glovers Reef Marine Reserve (GRMR). The remaining Areas were 




Figure 1. 2: Conceptual representation of marine resource management in Belize within the SES 









CHAPTER 2: MARINE RESOURCE MANAGEMET AND FISHERIES GOVERNANCE 





Forests and fisheries are often described as common pool resource systems (CPRS) 
because excluding resource unit (e.g. trees, land, and fish) extraction is challenging, and 
[over]consumption can contribute to the overall decline in resource availability to others (Olson 
1965, Ostrom 1990, Ostrom et al. 1999, Ostrom 2003). Marine fish species are examples of 
common-pool resources because: 1) they are seemingly available for extraction (Anderson and 
Uchida 2014), 2) it is difficult to identify, track, and estimate their abundance (Levine and 
Richmond 2015), and 3) it is challenging to manage the access to the resource across large and 
sometimes international oceanic boundaries (Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009, Urquhart et al. 
2014, Levine and Richmond 2015). Furthermore, the over-extraction of marine resources has 
implications for both environmental and livelihood outcomes. The overexploitation of marine 
systems and lack of effective management institutions manifests itself as overfishing, which 
leads to degradation of food webs and disruption of overall ecosystem functioning (Jackson et al. 
2001).  
Because subsistence and commercial fishing provide nearly three billion people with fish 
protein annually (FAO 2014), it is essential to develop management approaches to restore fish 
populations and maintain food security. The majority of present-day fisheries management relies 
                                                 
1 A version of this chapter is in review in Ocean and Coastal Management as Alves, C. Marine resource 
management and fisheries governance in Belize: historical analysis and ways forward. 
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on local governance and stock assessments, which report catch per unit effort (CPUE) and 
estimate maximum sustainable yield (MSY) via population and ecosystem models (Costello et 
al. 2008). Small-scale fisheries in the tropics are often managed by targeting single-species and 
setting catch limits on the species of interest. To combat the threat of overfishing, there has been 
increased interest in establishing multi-species fisheries, enforcing the use of a variety of gear 
strategies, setting catch limits, and restricting fishing in select areas(Jackson et al. 2001, Gaines 
et al. 2010, Valdés-Pizzini et al. 2016). 
Fisheries management measures, including formal licensing procedures and Marine 
Protected Areas (MPAs), have been the primary management response to overfishing. MPAs 
function by restricting fishing access to select offshore locations with the intention of increasing 
fish abundances and diversity within those areas, with fish spilling over to adjacent non-
protected areas (Gaines et al. 2010). MPAs then may be coupled with specific restrictions on 
fishing, e.g. catch share programs and special licenses, ideally leading to increased fish size and 
abundance to participating fishers (Costello et al. 2008). However, MPAs often fall short of 
achieving ecological and social benefits due to lack of specified policy and goals (e.g. “paper 
parks”), enforcement capacity, poaching, limited spillover, as well as social conflict when 
fishers’ livelihoods are negatively affected by MPAs (Huntington et al. 2011, Gill et al. 2017, 
Bruno et al. 2019). Common challenges to effective MPA governance also include confused 
goals, increased conflict, and unrealistic aims to scale-up beyond institutional capacity (Christie 
and White 2007), which demonstrate a need for improved MPA management.  
One promising way to overcome these issues with CPRS in fisheries is to include fishers 
in the management of their fisheries by leveraging social capital (Brondizio et al. 2009) and 
inspiring collective action among community members (Olson 1965, Ostrom 1990, Ostrom et al. 
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1999, Ostrom 2003). Social capital refers to the value of trust established by networks of 
individuals and institutions who share common interests (Brondizio et al. 2009). The 
organization of those institutions has the potential to inspire collective action from communities, 
where individuals self-organize into groups to perform actions that lead to group benefits that 
would not be available to a non-group member ((“Olson 1965, Ostrom 1990, Ostrom et al. 1999, 
Ostrom 2003, Brondizio et al. 2009, Pinho et al. 2012)). To encourage collective action among 
individuals in a community, a common objective and behavior towards resource utilization must 
be identified, but this is no easy feat (Ostrom 2007, Brondizio et al. 2009, Pinho et al. 2012, 
Reddy et al. 2013). The success of such collective action depends on the networks of institutions 
involved, and the direction of motivation, which oftentimes begins on the local level and works 
up to the state- or country-wide level (Foley 2012, Catzim and Walker 2013, Barner 2015, Ayer 
et al. 2018).  
Institutions for collective action in small-scale fisheries include fishing cooperatives and 
associations that advocate for fishers’ rights to management officials and that sometimes own 
shares of the total catch (Armitage et al. 2012, Basurto et al. 2013, Aceves-Bueno et al. 2017, 
Karr et al. 2017). These institutions provide a platform for fishers to become a part of 
community-based fisheries management (CBFM) by including them in the monitoring, 
enforcement, and overall decision-making processes involved in resource management in their 
communities (Wiber et al. 2004, Armitage et al. 2012, Pinho et al. 2012, Islam and Yew 2013, 
Urquhart et al. 2014, Valdés-Pizzini et al. 2016). Such participatory co-management may 
encourage environmental stewardship among fishers because they develop a sense of ownership 
of their fisheries, which provide additional incentives for sustainable fishing practices and 
continued collective action (Wiber et al. 2004, Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009). The overall 
11  
polycentric governance structure of CBFM contributes to broad stakeholder involvement, 
increased policy freedom at local levels, improved spatial fits between knowledge and action, 
and ultimately better responses to complex changes facing fisheries in the future (Cvitanovic et 
al. 2018). These benefits can lead to long-term sustainability of conservation measures. 
Scholars interested in CPRS institutions have identified several design principles that 
enhance probability of success. For instance, Ostrom identified eight design principles of long-
enduring CPRS institutions that have been identified as potential means to solve collective action 
problems (Ostrom 1990). These principles can act as a means to empirically analyze the 
robustness of institutions in securing environmental and livelihood outcomes because they can be 
more directly measured. The principles include: 1) clearly defined boundaries (such as a coastal 
region), 2) connection between local conditions and provisioning rules, 3) collective-choice 
arrangements, where the users participating in operational rules also have collective-choice 
rights, 4) monitoring of the resource system by the users, 5) graduated sanctions in place, 6) 
conflict-resolution mechanisms between all actors, 7) minimal recognition of rights to organize. 
where external government authorities do not challenge the rights of appropriators to make their 
own institutions, and 8) nested enterprises (Ostrom 1990). Such design principles can offer a 
method for determining the potential for the proper management of CPRS well into the future 
(Cinner et al. 2009, Levine and Richmond 2015). 
The purpose of this study was to assess the robustness of institutions involved in fisheries 
management in Belize by answering the following questions: 1) What are the institutions 
involved in fisheries management in Belize, what are their roles, and how are they structured? 2) 
How does the structure of enforcement and monitoring of Belize’s Managed Access program 
affect decision-making power and implementation of the program? 3) Does marine resource 
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management in Belize exhibit Ostrom’s eight design principles for long-enduring CPRS (Ostrom 
1990) and what implications does that have for the sustainability of the Managed Access 
program? I am defining “institutional robustness” by the presence of nested and decentralized 
institutions, as they are more resilient to shocks (Ostrom et al. 2010). To answer these questions, 
I used a mixed methods approach that combined review of secondary data, semi-structured 
interviews with key informants, and participant observation. As of late 2019, a new Fisheries 
Resources Bill was approved by the government of Belize, introducing many institutional 
changes to fisheries management across the country. This provides an opportunity to review the 
history of fisheries management in Belize and look critically into the future. My results suggest 
that Belize has the institutions in place to potentially be a long-enduring CPRS and overcome 
collective action problems (Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 2003) . However, certain challenges exist to 
the program being fully considered “participatory” in practice and in theory. 
 
Case Study Context 
Belize geography and marine ecology 
Belize is located in Central America. Natural resources are an important contributor to 
the national economy, including commercial fisheries, eco-tourism (marine and terrestrial), and 
logging (Karlsson and Bryceson 2016). Belize is home to the second longest barrier coral reef in 
the world – the Belize Mesoamerican Barrier Reef (BMBR). The Belize Barrier Reef is part of 
the larger Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System (MBRS), which traces the coasts of Belize, 
Mexico, and Honduras. The reef system incorporates the diverse marine habitats of mangroves, 
seagrass beds, fringing and patch coral reefs, and several offshore atolls. Because of this rich 
biodiversity, ecotourism and fishing are two of the most prevalent livelihood strategies among 
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Belizeans (Gopal et al. 2015). Lobster, conch, snapper, and grouper are the primary fishery 
species across Belize (Catzim and Walker 2013).  
 
Evolving coastal zone management in Belize 
Belize has a rich history of relying on natural resources (e.g. forest and marine products) 
for economic, political, and social benefit (Karlsson and Bryceson 2016), stemming from the 
colonial occupation of the British until Belize independence in 1973 (Wainwright 2009). Over 
the last 40+ years, tremendous changes in coastal zone management and fisheries policies have 
occurred in Belize (Figure 2.1). Throughout this timeline, NGOs were formed, which are now 
some of the key stakeholders and regional co-managers of the marine reserves. The first marine 
reserve, Hol Chan Marine Reserve (HCMR), was formed in 1987, which started a precedent for 
future marine protection. Shortly after, in 1989, the first International Coastal Resources 
Management Workshop was held, focusing on sustainably managing the use and development of 
coastal ecosystems for the benefit of future generations. In 1996, seven protected areas within the 
BMBR became designated as a part of a UNESCO World Heritage Site. In 1997, the Toledo 
Institute for Development and Environment (TIDE) was formed, pioneering the way for other 
community-based conservation organizations throughout Belize.  
In 2000, the Port Honduras Marine Reserve (PHMR) and Gladden Spit and Silk Cayes 
Marine Reserve (GSSCMR) were developed. TIDE soon became a co-manager of PHMR with 
the Belize Fisheries Department. In the early 2000s, additional NGOs began to form throughout 
Belize, including Healthy Reefs for Healthy People in 2003, the Sarteneja Alliance for 
Conservation and Development (SACD) in 2007, and the Southern Environmental Association 
(SEA) formed in 2008 from the merging of Friends of Nature (FoN) and the Toledo Association 
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for Sustainable Tourism and Empowerment (TASTE). In 2011, a rights-based fishery known as 
Managed Access (MA) was piloted at the Port Honduras Marine Reserve (PHMR) and Glover's 
Reef Marine Reserve (GRMR) (Foley 2012, Belize Fisheries Department 2015, Belize Fisheries 
Department 2019). This rights-based fishery granted commercial fishers rights to fish in select 
areas while requiring them to report their catch to management officials. Piloting MA was the 
first step toward eliminating the “race to fish” associated with Belize’s open access fishery 
regime. After reported decreases in illegal fishing and increased catch by fishers (Catzim and 
Walker 2013), the MA program was implemented nationwide in 2016, with seven additional 
sites added to Belize’s territorial waters (Figure 2.2) (Foley 2012, Belize Fisheries Department 
2015, Belize Fisheries Department 2019). Belize currently contains a network of marine reserves 
with varying levels of access/extraction of marine resources. Within the marine reserves are 
General Use Zones (GUZ,) where regulated extractive activities are allowed, Replenishment 
Zones (RZ), where non-extractive activities are permitted, and Preservation Zones (PRZ), which 
are open to research activities only (Belize Fisheries Department 2015, Belize Fisheries 
Department 2019).  
Most of the marine reserves are co-managed by an NGO and/or the Belize Fisheries 
Department. As of late 2019, a new Fisheries Resource Bill was approved by the Cabinet, after 
nearly 10 years of deliberation by the federal government, scientists, fishers, and NGO co-
managers. Included in this bill is the development of a Fisheries Council, with representatives 
from diverse sectors, increased enforcement and monitoring guidelines, and ways to improve 





This study used a mixed methods approach that combined reviewing secondary data, 
semi-structured interviews with key informants and participant observation. The review of 
secondary data was ongoing throughout the process of this study, and included published and 
unpublished governmental and non-governmental reports, academic publications (thorough 
literature searches), and online resources. Semi-structured interviews with key informants and 
participant observation occurred in June and September 2017, and from April - June 2019.  
Key informants included individuals in leadership positions and natural resource 
managers in the governmental (n = 8) and non-governmental sectors (n = 26) within Belize. Key 
informants were also fishers (n = 23), some of whom were leaders in their communities (e.g. 
served on committees, fisher associations), while others were vocal about voicing their opinions 
about several fisheries-related topics. Participant observation included: attendance at fisher 
forums, meetings, and presentations by natural resource managers, and various formal and 
informal gatherings within the communities. Such community gatherings included the fish and 
produce markets and the Chocolate Festival in Punta Gorda, the Mango Festival in Hopkins, the 
Lobster Festival in Placencia, and the fish market in Dangriga. All respondents remained 
anonymous throughout this process. 
 
Results 
What are the institutions involved in fisheries management in Belize, what are their roles, and 
how are they structured? 
 
Here, I describe the complex, polycentric, nested, and decentralized structure (Ostrom et 
al. 2010) of the institutions involved in fisheries management in Belize. The government, 
tourism sector, NGOs, and fishers sectors represent the type of institutions involved in the 
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fisheries decision-making process (Figure 2.3). The key informant interviews and participant 
observations revealed that for many sectors, including the governmental and fishers’ sector, 
institutions are nested within each other, providing for enhanced information transfer, 
collaboration, and decision-making power. In the NGO, tourism, and fishers sector, many 
institutions are also decentralized, representing the local community and protected area at 
regional and national levels. 
 
Government Sector 
The first institutional sector involved in fisheries management in Belize represents the 
federal government. Because coastal resource management in Belize involves the extraction of 
natural resources, use of Belize’s territorial waters, and the trade and exporting of marine 
products, many governmental institutions are involved. The participant observation, key 
informant interviews and review of secondary literature revealed six ministries in the 
governmental sector, within which the different governing institutions reside (Figure 2.4). These 
nested institutions (McCabe and Feiock 2005a, Ostrom et al. 2010, Ostrom 2012) set rules for 
domestic and international trade, economic development, natural resource management, national 
security and enforcement of governmental policies.  
Within the Ministry of Economic Development, Petroleum, Investment, Trade and 
Commerce is the Belize Trade and Investment Development Service (BELTRAIDE, 
Government of Belize 2019). BELTRAIDE promotes and enables socio-economic development. 
The Belize Port Authority and Belize Customs and Excise are two institutions within the 
Ministry of Transport and National Emergency Management. The Belize Port Authority is led by 
the Ports Commissioner (a.k.a. Harbour Master) and is responsible for regulating and developing 
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Belize’s ports, harbors and shipping as well as ensuring the safety of all vessels navigating 
within Belize’s territorial waters (Belize Port Authority 2019). Belize Customs and Excise 
develops and implements policies to ensure increased safety/security and develop the effective 
platforms for effective trade and revenue collection (Belize Customs and Excise 2018). 
International trade policies are developed by the Belize Customs and Excise, which are essential 
to the export of lobster and conch as the primary marine products exported from Belize (Belize 
Customs and Excise 2018). 
The Belize Tourism Board (BTB), and the National Institute of Culture and History 
(NICH) are within the Ministry of Tourism, Civil Aviation, and Culture (Ministry of Tourism 
and Civil Aviation 2019). The BTB is a partner between the government and the private 
(tourism) sector in Belize, working closely with four tourism stakeholder groups (hotels, tour 
operators, tour guides, and the cruise industry (Belize Tourism Board 2020)). The role of BTB in 
natural resource management will be explained in the subsequent section. NICH is a statutory 
body that preserves and shares Belize’s historic and ethnic roots (National Institute of Culture 
and History 2020).  
The Belize Coast Guard (Belize Ministry of National Security 2016a), Belize Police 
Department (Devex 2020), Belize Defence Force (Belize Defence Force 2020) and National 
Emergency Management Organization (NEMO, National Emergency Management Organization 
2020) are housed within the Ministry of National Security (Belize Ministry of National Security 
2016b) as entities all responsible for ensuring the safety and security of those in Belize. The 
Belize Coast Guard and Belize Defence Force are part of the professional military with soldiers 
trained in ensuring the safety and security of those in Belize. The Belize Coast Guard enforces 
maritime laws and protects Belize’s territorial waters (Belize Ministry of National Security 
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2016a), while the Belize Defence Force is more focused on the defense of Belize and supporting 
the Civil Authorities in maintaining order in Belize (Belize Defence Force 2020). The Belize 
Police Department works on more local levels to preserve law and order across the country, with 
three police for every 1000 inhabitants (Devex 2020). NEMO is responsible for providing 
citizens with information regarding emergency preparedness, storm tracking, and natural 
disasters (National Emergency Management Organization 2020).  
The Belize Agricultural Health Authority (BAHA, Belize Agricultural Health Authority 
2020) and the Belize Department of Cooperatives (Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and 
Immigration 2017a) is housed within the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Immigration 
(Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Immigration 2017b). The BAHA oversees animal health, 
plant health, quarantine and food safety services that prioritize the health and wellness of those it 
serves while strengthening national food security and facilitating trade/commerce. BAHA is 
directly involved in the production, management, and trade of the marine products (lobster, 
conch, finfish) that are sold domestically and internationally (Belize Agricultural Health 
Authority 2020). The Department of Cooperatives provides regulatory services for 
entrepreneurial development programs related to the cooperative sector in Belize. The fisheries 
cooperatives (explained below) are regulated by this department (Ministry of Food, Agriculture, 
and Immigration 2017a). 
The Forest Department (The Forest Department 2019), Department of the Environment 
(The Department of the Environment 2020), Fisheries Department (The Belize Fisheries 
Department 2013), Protected Areas Conservation Trust (PACT, Protected Areas Conservation 
Trust 2019) and Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute (CZMAI, Coastal Zone 
Management Authority 2019) are all housed within the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, 
19  
Forestry, the Environment, and Sustainable Development (Government of Belize 2020). The 
Forest Department enforces the policies and regulations for the sustainable management of 
Belize’s forested ecosystems (The Forest Department 2019). The Department of the 
Environment focuses on establishing, recommending and enforcing policies that improve 
environmental quality, limit pollution, and promote public engagement (The Department of the 
Environment 2020).  
The Fisheries Department is responsible for the development and enforcement of 
management policies surrounding aquatic and fisheries resources, with a focus on sustainability 
for present and future generations. They are the primary government agency involved in fisheries 
management policies across Belize, working closely with the tourism and NGO sectors (The 
Belize Fisheries Department 2013). PACT is a national conservation trust which manages 
Belize’s National Protected Areas System (NPAS) through strategic partnerships and investment 
opportunities (Protected Areas Conservation Trust 2019). CZMAI is a statutory body within the 
government responsible for the development and implementation of coastal zone management 
(CZM) strategies in Belize (Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute 2019). 
 
Tourism Sector 
The key informant interviews, participant observation and review of secondary data 
revealed three main tourism sector institutions involved in fisheries management in Belize: The 
Belize Tourism Board (BTB, Belize Tourism Board 2020), the Belize Tourism Industry 
Association (BTIA, Belize Tourism Industry Association 2020) and the Belize Hotel Association 
(BHA, Belize Hotel Association 2020, Figure 2.5). The tourism sector is included in this paper 
for a variety of reasons: A) fishers sell their catch to restaurants, resorts and hotels, B) many 
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fishers are also tour guides (they even take tourists out to go recreational fishing, thereby relying 
on “healthy” marine ecosystems for guests), and C) they are a big economic and decision-
making stakeholder in determining, expanding, and enforcing marine protected areas.  
Both the BTB and BTIA act as connections between the private and public sectors of the 
tourism industry. As previously stated, the BTB is a statutory body within the Ministry of 
Tourism (government sector) that acts as a strategic partner between the government and the 
private tourism sector. It develops, markets and implements tourism programs to fulfill the 
emerging needs of local and international tourism markets. The organizational structure of BTB 
includes branches such as Marketing and Industry Relations, Destination Planning and Cruise, 
Information Technology, and Finance (Belize Tourism Board 2020). The BTIA is an umbrella 
organization for the tourism industry’s private sector because it has representation on almost 
every government, legislative, advisory and consultative committee. BTIA is governed by a 
president and board of directors while the management of everyday operations is led by an 
executive director and secretariat (Belize Tourism Industry Association 2020).  
The BTB and BTIA represent dive shops, cultural vendors and experiences, tour operator 
associations, tour operators, tour guide associations, tour guides, and hotels. All tour guides and 
tour operators do not have to be members of their respective associations, but they need to be 
registered with the BTB. The cruise industry is only represented by the BTB while sports fishing 
guides are only represented by the BTIA. The BTIA also has local chapters based on the 
destination, including (but not limited to) those in San Pedro, Caye Caulker, Cayo, and Corozol 
(Belize Tourism Industry Association 2020b). Lastly, the BHA is a non-profit, NGO and 
Belize’s oldest private sector tourism organization. It supports the sustainable growth of member 
hotels and the tourism industry in Belize via marketing initiatives, inter-and intra-sector 
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partnerships and training services. Its membership includes educational facilities, resorts, lodges, 
condominiums, homestays and hotels (Belize Hotel Association 2020).  
 
Environmental Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Sector 
The NGOs included in this paper focus on the environment and sustainability, and are not 
exhaustive of all NGOs in Belize. However, since the early 1990s, local and international NGOs 
have been working in Belize to promote the environmental conservation and sustainability of 
natural resources (Figures 2.1 and 2.6). Some NGOs are also co-managers of marine reserves 
with the Belize Fisheries Department. For the purpose of this paper, I divided the NGOs into 
those that are international with a local Belize chapter, and those that are local to a community or 
region within Belize. Making that distinction is important when considering the institutional 
stability, resources, and governance potential of all of these NGOs.  Through many semi-
structured interviews with key informants, participant observation and detailed review of 
secondary data, I describe all NGOs involved in coastal resource management and conservation 
in Belize (Figure 2.6). 
Many of the NGOs local to a community focus on particular regions, marine reserves or a 
combination of the two. Many combine research, environmental monitoring, enforcement of 
fisheries policies, environmental outreach, and community development. The NGOs are led by a 
suite of full-time staff members, and overseen by boards of directors, which consist of 
community members, and representatives from the tourism and fisher sectors. The Southern 
Environmental Association (SEA) is based in Placencia, Belize, and is a co-manager of the 
Gladden Spit and Silk Cayes Marine Reserve (GSSCMR) and Laughing Bird National Park 
(LBNP, Yello Belize 2020). The Belize Federation of Fishers (BFF) is an umbrella organization 
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that represents many individual fishers and fisher associations, but not all of them. Membership 
to BFF is voluntary. The BFF is led by an executive managing committee of 16 community 
representatives, many of whom are in leadership positions in their communities/fisher 
associations. The BFF was registered as a fisher community-focused conservation organization 
for commercial fishers in 2011, and incorporated in 2013 (BFFishers 2015). The Toledo Institute 
for Development and Environment (TIDE) is based in Punta Gorda, Belize, and works primarily 
in the Maya Mountain Marine Corridor of southern Belize. TIDE co-manages the Port Honduras 
Marine Reserve (PHMR) with the Fisheries Department, co-manages Payne’s Creek National 
Park, and manages TIDE Private Protected Lands (TIDE 2020).   
The Sarteneja Alliance for Conservation and Development (SACD) is based in Sarteneja, 
Belize, and serves the stakeholder communities of the Corozal Bay Wildlife Sanctuary (CBWS, 
SACD Belize 2020). The Belize Audubon Society (BAS) is another NGO co-manager of 
Lighthouse Reef Atoll, where the Belize Blue Hole and Half Moon Caye are located. BAS is 
headquartered in Belize City and is the oldest environmental NGO in Belize, having been 
founded in 1969 (Belize Audubon Society 2015). The Turneffe Atoll Sustainability Association 
(TASA) is also located in Belize City, and it co-manages the Turneffe Atoll Marine Reserve 
(TAMR, Turneffe Atoll Marine Reserve 2020). The Coalition for Sustainable Fisheries was 
formed in 2018 primarily to advocate for a gillnet ban throughout Belize and consists of 
conservation organizations, tourism operators, and sports and commercial fisherfolk (The 
Coalition for Sustainable Fisheries 2020). Fragments of Hope (FoH) is another NGO local to 
Belize, which focuses on coral restoration projects and sustainable management of coastal 
habitats (Fragments of Hope, Belize Ltd. 2015).  
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On the other hand, international environmental NGOs with chapters in Belize focus on a 
variety of environmental issues, both marine and terrestrial, and their international status enables 
them to leverage broader resources. Many of these international organizations combine science-
based conservation work with stakeholder engagement and community development. They often 
collaborate with many of the Belizean-based NGOs, fisher communities and government 
agencies to meet common conservation goals. One such environmental NGO is Healthy Reefs 
for Healthy People, with projects across the entire Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System (MBRS), 
in Mexico, Belize, Guatemala and Honduras (Healthy Reefs 2020). Healthy Reefs collaborates 
with NGOs and government agencies to co-produce annual ecological monitoring “Report 
Cards” on the status of the MBRS. MarAlliance is another international NGO, based in 
Sarteneja, Belize, which focuses on improving the conservation of threatened marine species and 
their habitats, most notably sharks and rays. They have other projects across the MBRS as well 
as in Cabo Verde and Micronesia (MarAlliance 2020). Oceana is another international NGO with 
projects in Belize. Oceana was established in 1999 in the United States as an ocean advocacy 
group dedicated to protecting and restoring the world’s oceans. Their work in Belize includes the 
passing of legislation banning offshore oil drilling, decreasing ocean plastic pollution and most 
recently, petitioning for the elimination of gill net use by fishers (Oceana 2020). Blue Ventures 
also works Belize on grassroots marine conservation initiatives (Blue Ventures Conservation 
2020).  
Headquartered on Carrie Bow Caye is a Smithsonian Institution Field Station for their 
Caribbean Coral Reef Ecosystems (CCRE) Program. The Carrie Bow Field Station includes a 
scientific laboratory, housing for visiting scholars, SCUBA facilities, and other resources for 
long-term monitoring of the Belize Barrier Reef System. The World-Wide Fund (WWF, 
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formerly World Wildlife Fund) is another international organization that has been working in 
Central America since 1987. They were instrumental in the establishment of Belize’s first MPA, 
the Hol Chan Marine Reserve. Since then, they have been involved in developing a season for 
spiny lobster, developing the Turneffe Atoll as an MPA and in the completion of Belize’s 
National Integrated Coastal Zone Management Plan (World Wide Fund for Nature 2020). The 
Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) has also been working in Belize for several decades, with 
projects including improved enforcement of fishing regulations, education and outreach 
programs, and spawning aggregations research. WCS is also the only international organization 
that serves as a co-manager of the Glover’s Reef Marine Reserve (GRMR) with the Belize 
Fisheries Department (Wildlife Conservation Society 2020).  
The Nature Conservancy (TNC) has been working in Belize since 1991, on projects 
ranging from seaweed aquaculture to seafood traceability in cooperatives (The Nature 
Conservancy 2020). They are working closely with Resilient Central America (ResCA) to 
improve seafood traceability at the National Fishermen Cooperative in Belize City (The Nature 
Conservancy 2019, 2020). The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), and Rare collaborated with 
the government, NGOs, and fisher communities to transition fisheries management from an 
open-access regime to the rights-based/TURF program Managed Access from 2009-2017. They 
have also been integral in the development of the new Fisheries Resources Bill of 2020 
(Environmental Defense Fund 2020, Rare 2020). 
 
Fishers Sector 
From key informant interviews and participant observation, I divided the fishers sector 
into three broad categories with unique license requirements: sport, recreational, and commercial 
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(Figure 2.7). Sport fishers are required to have a specific license to participate in catch-and-
release of these species: tarpon, permit, bonefish, and snook. Recreational fishers do not need 
licenses. As of July 2016, all commercial fishers are required to obtain a Managed Access 
license, which grants them rights to fish in 1-2 of the areas outlined in Figure 2.2 (Belize 
Fisheries Department 2015, Belize Fisheries Department 2019). All fishers are required to abide 
by the coastal zone management rules and follow guidelines for marine reserves (i.e. they are not 
allowed to extract marine products where it is prohibited). All three of these groups of fishers 
can economically benefit from their fishing activities, because commercial fishers sell their 
marine product to formal and informal markets within Belize, and the sport and recreational 
fishers often rely on income related to the tourism sector (source: key informant interviews and 
participant observation).  
Commercial fishers include individual fishers, fishers’ associations (of which many are a 
part), Rainforest Seafoods, Ltd., cooperatives, and the Belize Federation of Fishers (BFF). The 
Belize Federation of Fishers was previously described. Many fishers are members of – and 
therefore sell their product to – one or all of the following fishing cooperatives: National 
Fisherman Cooperative (in Belize City), the Northern Fishermen Cooperative (in 
Independence/Mango Creek and Belize City), and the Placencia Produces Cooperative. These 
three cooperatives fall under the governing body, the Belize Department of Cooperatives. 
National and Northern Fishermen Cooperatives purchase only lobster and conch, primarily for 
export, while Placencia Produces Cooperative purchases lobster, conch and finfish. For fishers to 
be members of these cooperatives, they must pay an annual membership fee. Fishers benefit 
from cooperative membership by not only getting competitive prices for marine products, but 
also opportunities for small grants, raffles, and professional development. Fishers can also 
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choose to sell lobster and conch to Rainforest Seafoods, which has collection facilities in Mango 
Creek/Independence and Dangriga, Belize, and exports the product internationally (Rainforest 
Seafoods 2020).   
Providing the most direct opportunities/benefits for fishers is membership/participation in 
a fisher association. Most of the fishers’ associations across Belize represent the commercial 
fishers of individual coastal fishing communities at regional and national scales. A complete list 
of the fishers associations can be found in Figure 2.7. Several communities have representation 
by multiple fisher associations. For instance, fishers engaged in aquaculture activities in 
Sarteneja can be represented by the Sarteneja Tilapia Growers and Development Association, 
and if they are also commercial fishers, be represented by the Sarteneja United Local Fishermen 
Association. Similarly, Dangriga has two fishers’ associations: the Wabafu Fisherman 
Association (“Wabafu” is a Garifuna word meaning “people power”) and the Belizean Chairmen 
of Fishers. In the Toledo District, and around Punta Gorda Town, fishers are represented by the 
Toledo Fishermen Association, and the Southern Fisherfolk Alliance Association. To be a 
functioning fisher association, there needs to be regular fee-paying membership, annual 
meetings, and meetings throughout the year. Executive meetings must also be held where 
records/minutes of the meetings are maintained and shared with the membership (source: key 
informant interviews).   
Individual fishers may be members of one fisher association, 1-2 cooperatives, and the 
BFF (by way of their fisher association), any combination, or not represented by any of these 
organizations. Membership to a fisher association and/or cooperative is voluntary, and not all 
individual fishers are members/represented by any fisher-oriented organization. This provides a 
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challenge when considering the equitable representation of fisher’s needs at local, regional, and 
national scales (i.e. some voices and viewpoints will be excluded due to this structure). 
 
Synthesis 
Overall, the governmental, tourism, NGO, and fishers sectors involved in fisheries 
management in Belize demonstrate highly polycentric, nested, and decentralized institutions. In 
total, there are 16 governmental institutions housed within six ministries all involved in the 
rulemaking, enforcement, and oversight of different aspects of fisheries management in Belize. 
The tourism sector is represented by three primary institutions, but they represent the breadth of 
actors involved in tourism at local and national scales. The NGO sector is vast, with international 
(n = 11) and local (n = 8) agencies invested in environmental and fisheries sustainability in 
Belize. Because many of the NGOs are involved in their local communities, a decentralized 
structure is represented by these entities. Lastly, the fishers sector represents a complex 
arrangement of cooperatives, fisher associations, and individual interest groups, which 
demonstrates the varying degrees of self-organization and collective action potential of the actors 
here.  
 
How does the structure of enforcement and monitoring of Belize’s Managed Access program 
affect decision-making power and implementation of the program? 
 
From 2017-present, I conducted 57 key informant interviews to describe and understand 
the institutional framework for the enforcement and monitoring of the Managed Access program, 
which is highly decentralized (Figure 2.8) (Ostrom 1990, Dietz 2003, Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 
2018). In Figure 2.8, the Belize Fisheries Department (BFD) is depicted as the highest governing 
body because the BFD sets the rules and regulations for the licensing process, logbook reporting, 
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and enforcement of MA (Belize Fisheries Department 2015, Belize Fisheries Department 2019). 
The individuals representing the BFD in this depiction include the Fisheries Administrator 
(Beverly Wade), who oversees the entire BFD. Working closely with her are the Marine 
Scientific Research (MSR) Permit Officer (Mauro Gongora), and the Managed Access Liaison 
Officers in Belize City (Isabel Martinez) and Punta Gorda. The decentralized structure 
represented in Figure 2.8 leads to a division of decision-making power from the Belize Fisheries 
Department, a centralized governing body, down to the local, community-level, where each MA 
area is represented by its own committee. These MA committees consist of representatives from 
many of the sectors described in previous sections. The basis for the MA program was to pair 
marine reserves with the territorial user rights for fishing (TURF) areas, so each of the eight MA 
areas has a marine reserve paired with it. As such, each area is [co-]managed by a government 
and/or NGO agency (Belize Fisheries Department 2015, Belize Fisheries Department 2019). 
Because MA implementation was driven by a partnership between the Environmental 
Defense Fund (EDF) and the Belize Government, there are representatives from EDF and BFD 
on the Managed Access Technical Team (MATT). From 2014-2017 the MATT was an extension 
of the BFD and was responsible for implementing MA on a national level. Members of the 
MATT provided leadership, advice, and knowledge to those on the Managed Access Working 
Group (MAWG). The MAWG consists of the members of the MATT, but also the leadership 
(Executive Directors) of the co-manager NGOs, representatives from the Forest Department, 
individuals from the fisher communities, and academic partners. The role of the MAWG was to 
develop, implement, and oversee Managed Access (Belize Fisheries Department 2019). From 
2013-15, the MAWG and BFD underwent an extensive consultation process with key 
stakeholders of the fishing industry to develop the framework and plan for MA implementation 
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nationwide. The MAWG provides a link between each MA area and the BFD by providing 
information transfer, and resources for enforcement, licensing and logbook reporting (source: 
key informant interviews). The governance of each of the eight MA areas (excluding Area 9: 
deep water) involves diverse stakeholder groups (Figure 2.8). The primary management 
institution for each MA area is the MA Committees, which consist of elected persons from the 
fishing communities, and representatives from the BFD and co-managers. The purpose of the 
MA Committees is to provide community leadership, scrutinize license applications, improve 
transparency in the license granting process, inform their communities about program updates, 
and assist with improved data collection/reporting (Foley 2012, Belize Fisheries Department 
2015, Belize Fisheries Department 2019). 
Area 1 is co-managed by the Sarteneja Alliance for Conservation and Development 
(SACD), the Forest Department, and the BFD. SACD collaborates with the Forest Department to 
manage the Corozal Bay Wildlife Sanctuary. Area 1 encompasses these three marine reserves, 
which are all managed by the BFD: Bacalar Chico, Hol Chan and Caye Caulker. The fisher 
communities who mostly use Area 1 are Sarteneja, Chunox, Copper Bank, Caye Caulker, and 
San Pedro. Area 2 is managed by the BFD and is the only MA area that does not consist of a 
marine reserve. The fishing communities who mostly use Area 2 are the same as Area 1, but may 
also include Belize City. Area 3 is co-managed by the Southern Environmental Association 
(SEA), the Forest Department and the BFD. SEA manages the Gladden Spit and Silk Cayes 
Marine Reserve and works with the Forest Department to manage the Laughing Bird Caye 
National Park. BFD manages South Water Caye, and the parts of Area 3 that are not managed by 
SEA or the Forest Department. The fishers that mostly use Area 3 come from these communities: 
Dangriga, Hopkins, Riversdale, Seine Bight, Independence, Placencia, and Monkey River.  
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Area 4 includes the Sapodilla Cayes Marine Reserve, which is managed by the BFD. The 
fisher communities that mostly use Area 4 are from Monkey River, Punta Negra, Punta Gorda, 
and Barranco. Area 5 is the entirety of the Port Honduras Marine Reserve (PHMR), which is 
managed by the Toledo Institute for Development and Environment (TIDE). TIDE works closely 
with the BFD to issue licenses to fishers and to improve enforcement of the area. There are 
general use areas of the marine reserve where fishing is allowed, but also conservation and 
replenishment zones, where fishing is restricted. The fishing communities who mostly use Area 
5 are Monkey River, Punta Negra, Punta Gorda and Barranco. Like Area 5, Area 6 is also a 
marine reserve. Area 6 is the Turneffe Atoll Marine Reserve (TAMR), which is co-managed by 
the Turneffe Atoll Sustainability Association (TASA). The fishing communities who mostly use 
Area 6 are Belize City, Chunox, Caye Caulker, San Pedro.  
Area 7 comprises the Lighthouse Reef Atoll, which is home to the Half Moon Caye and 
Blue Hole National Monuments. These sites are co-managed by the Belize Audubon Society 
(BAS) and the BFD. The fishers who mostly use Area 7 are from these communities: Belize 
City, Chunox, Caye Caulker, San Pedro, Copper Bank and Sarteneja. Area 8 is the Glover’s Reef 
Marine Reserve (GRMR), which is co-managed by the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS). 
The fisher communities who mostly use Area 8 are from Dangriga, Riversdale, Hopkins, Seine 
Bight, Placencia, and Independence. Area 9 is the only area that does not have a formal Managed 
Access Committee, and is where all fishers are allowed to fish. Area 9 is mostly deep slope 
fishing, which is very gear/resource-intensive, so not many fishers go there. It is, however, being 
explored as a new fishery option (Belize Fisheries Department 2019). 
In summary, the enforcement and monitoring of the Managed Access program in Belize 
is highly decentralized (Ostrom 1990, Dietz 2003, Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2018). This 
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structure has implications for how decisions are made and implemented from the national levels 
down to the individual fisher communities. The presence of fishers, NGO leaders, and 
governmental representatives on each MA committee provides for improved information transfer 
and implementation between the local and national levels. Furthermore, having each MA area 
overseen by a committee enables for more equitable representation of the users of each area.  
 
Does marine resource management in Belize exhibit Ostrom’s eight design principles for long-
enduring CPRs (Ostrom 1990) and what implications does that have for the sustainability of the 
Managed Access program? 
 
The results in this section suggest that fisheries management in Belize exhibits all eight 
of Ostrom’s design principles for long-enduring CPRs (Ostrom 1990, Table 2.1), but some are 
more established than others. This leads to an imbalance of governing power and areas of 
improvement for the program in the long run. For instance, the MA fishing areas within Belize’s 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) represent the clearly defined boundaries of the resource system 
(Foley 2012, Belize Fisheries Department 2015, Fujita et al. 2017, Belize Fisheries Department 
2019), for which the provisioning rules of the actors apply. MA committees not only connect the 
local conditions to provisioning rules but they also give collective-choice arrangements to the 
fishers because they are platforms for fishers to represent the interests of their communities to 
natural resource managers (Belize Fisheries Department 2015, Belize Fisheries Department 
2019, key informant interviews). The local community-based NGOs as co-managers of marine 
reserves provide further connection between the local context and provisioning rule development 
at the national level (Belize Fisheries Department 2015, Belize Fisheries Department 2019, key 
informant interviews). The NGOs, in collaboration with the BFD, do the majority of the 
monitoring and enforcement of the resource system, which takes the responsibility of monitoring 
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away from the users (fishers). However, fishers are quite aware of transboundary and non-
licensed users in their area, leading to a potential increase in fisher-led monitoring efforts in the 
future (sources: key informant interviews and participant observation). If users are found 
breaking the provisioning rules, then there are graduated sanctions in place. Currently, the BFD 
observes a three-strike rule; first a verbal warning, second a written warning, and third is arrest 
managers (Catzim and Walker 2013, Belize Fisheries Department 2015, Belize Fisheries 
Department 2019, key informant interviews). However, the new Fisheries Resource Bill is much 
stricter and involves a multi-step process for citing infractions, providing evidence, charging, and 
then serving time in jail managers (Belize Fisheries Department 2019, key informant interviews). 
If a fisher receives an infraction, the MA committee may decide to deny them their commercial 
license in the following year managers (Belize Fisheries Department 2015, Belize Fisheries 
Department 2019, key informant interviews).  
To resolve any conflicts, certain mechanisms are in place, including fisher forums and 
outreach to fishers by co-managers. Through my participant observation at several fisher forums, 
they occur at least once a year between all marine stakeholders of the eight MA areas, and offer a 
place of information-sharing. However, not all fishers are in attendance, very few have the 
opportunity to speak, the few who do are occasionally cut short, and they do not prefer to be 
shown graphs of data from the co-managers. In Belize, there is minimal recognition of rights to 
organize as the government recognizes and does not challenge the rights of the users to self-
organize by way of active fishers’ organizations, the BFF, and cooperatives managers (Belize 
Fisheries Department 2015, Belize Fisheries Department 2019, key informant interviews, 
participant observation). 
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The final design principle for long-enduring CPRs that Belize fisheries management 
exhibits is nested enterprises (Ostrom 1990, Table 2.1). Excellent examples of nested institutions 
can be found in Figures 2.4 and 2.8, where Figure 2.4 depicts each governmental agency nested 
within a Ministry, and Figure 2.8 demonstrates that the governance of each MA area is nested 
within the Managed Access Working Group, the Managed Access Technical Team, and all 
overseen by the Belize Fisheries Department. Furthermore, in the near future, a Fisheries Council 
will be formed, consisting of representatives from the government, tourism, fisheries and NGO 
sectors, an expert in fisheries science, and the Fisheries Administrator. These entities will be 
nested under the umbrella of the Fisheries Council, which will be an established advisory body to 
make recommendations to the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries, Forestry, the Environment and 
Sustainable Development (Belize Fisheries Department 2019). 
In summary, fisheries management in Belize demonstrates all eight components of a 
long-enduring CPR system, as defined by Ostrom (Ostrom 1990), suggesting the actors have the 
potential to overcome collective action problems in the long run. There are (1) clearly defined 
boundaries of the resource system, (2) a connection between local conditions and provisioning 
rules, (3) collective-choice arrangements by the fishers on MA committees, (4) monitoring of the 
resource system by the users, (5) graduated sanctions in place for rule infractions, (6) conflict-
resolution mechanisms, (7) minimal recognition of rights to organize by the government, and (8) 
nested enterprises (Ostrom 1990, Table 2.1). While the MA program in Belize is less than a 
decade-old in action, the presence of all eight CPR design principles suggests it will be a 




Belize’s fisheries management policies demonstrate institutional robustness 
Through extensive review of primary and secondary literature, semi-structured interviews 
with key informants, and participant observation, this study examines the institutional robustness 
of Belize’s fisheries management strategies. The results indicate that the institutions are robust 
and resilient to future shocks due to their polycentric, decentralized, and nested governance 
structure (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2018). For example, fisheries management in Belize 
demonstrates polycentric governance because the governmental, NGO, tourism, and fishers 
sectors each represent the many centers of decision-making that often function independently of 
one another (Ostrom et al. 1961, Ostrom 2010). In the case of Belize, these various sectors each 
play an important role in the monitoring, decision-making, enforcement and provisioning rules in 
the common pool resource system (Ostrom 2010). Polycentric fisheries governance has been 
found to overcome several limitations found in other systems because it promotes broad levels of 
stakeholder engagement, increases policy freedom at local levels and ensures governance 
responses are implemented at appropriate scales (Cvitanovic et al. 2018).  
However, the institutions involved in fisheries management in Belize also function in a 
decentralized way because the decision-making power is distributed to those at the local 
community level (Ostrom 1990, Dietz 2003). For example, TIDE co-manages the PHMR in 
southern Belize by working closely with fishers from several communities (Punta Gorda, Punta 
Negra, Monkey River, and Barranco). As an institution, TIDE builds trust with the fishers while 
also communicating their needs to the Belize Fisheries Department. Decentralization has been 
found to be a very effective tool in effective governance of natural resources because it takes the 
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strain off of centralized forms of governance while granting the decision-making power to the 
users of the system (Ostrom 1990, Dietz 2003, Wright et al. 2016). 
Further contributing to institutional robustness is the nested nature of several key 
institutions involved in fisheries management in Belize (McCabe and Feiock 2005b, Ostrom et 
al. 2010). Like previously described, each government agency is nested within a Ministry, which 
oversees multiple agencies with similar objectives and provides for linkages between such 
agencies. The fishers’ sector is another nested enterprise where individual fishers can be 
represented by fishers associations local to their community, and then several fishers associations 
are a part of the Belize Federation of Fishers (BFF), which represents fishers at the national 
level. This nesting can lead to improved stability in the face of global change and ongoing 
stresses (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2018). Overall, the polycentric, decentralized and nested 
governance structure of the institutions involved in fisheries management in Belize contributes to 
overall institutional robustness and resilience to shocks in the future (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 
2018). 
 
Belize has potential to be a long-enduring common pool resource system 
This study demonstrates that Belize contains the necessary institutions in places to 
become a long-enduring CPRS and potentially overcome obstacles to collective action. While 
fisheries management policies in Belize represent all eight of Ostrom’s design principles for 
long-enduring CPRS (Ostrom 1990), these three components could be improved upon to achieve 
further institutional stability: the monitoring of the resource system by the users, conflict-
resolution mechanisms, and minimal recognition of rights to organize. This could be because 
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more time is needed to fully implement these components of community-based management in 
Belize.  
For example, in a comparison of Hawaii’s community-based subsistence fisheries area 
legislation to that of American Samoa, the program in American Samoa comprised more of the 
design principles, primarily due to the successful implementation of its program (Levine and 
Richmond 2015). The Hawaii program has the potential to consist of the common-pool resource 
design principles, but only if effective institutions are in place (Levine and Richmond 2015). My 
study demonstrates that Belize has a variety of institutions and a diverse governance structure to 
ensure the design principles endure in the long-term. In two additional co-managed fisheries, one 
in Kenya and one in Madagascar, Cinner et al. (2009) found their systems to also be lacking 
several design principles to overcome CPR problems. Monitoring of resources and surveillance 
were two of the missing components of these co-management regimes, while clearly defined 
geographic boundaries, collective choice arrangements, graduated sanctions and nested 
enterprises were partially implemented (Cinner et al. 2009). Like in Belize, monitoring and 
surveillance were two components in Kenya and Madagascar co-managed fisheries needing 
improvement, demonstrating the challenge of encouraging users to become more involved in the 
monitoring and surveillance of the resource system. 
 
Fisher associations are mechanisms for collective action 
The fishers’ associations in Belize and other small-scale fisheries contexts are platforms 
for fishers to engage in collective action. They are self-organizing, where several motivated 
individuals recognize a need for increased representation at the local, community-level (Ostrom 
2003). Because Belize has a wide range of fishers’ associations, ranging geographically across 
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the country, the likelihood of fisher representation at local levels is much higher than if there 
were very few associations (Partelow et al. 2020). However, not all commercial fishers are 
members of fisher associations, leading to discrepancies in equity/inclusivity/representation. 
Therefore, some voices are lost while others are amplified. The inequitable representation of 
fishers by fisher associations can also lead to corruption (Hanich and Tsamenyi 2009, Cross 
2016, Nunan et al. 2018) and biases in the decision-making processes (Semitiel-García and 
Noguera-Méndez 2019).  
Fisher associations provide a platform for individual fishers to build social capital and 
trust within their communities and advocate for them at the national level, particularly with the 
NGO and governmental sectors. In a freshwater fishery in the Amazon, fishers identified a need 
for regulating their fisheries when the state failed to provide them with effective institutions to 
do so. Over time, this decentralized, community-based management led to protection of 
freshwater fish populations and stabilized livelihoods (Pinho et al. 2012). Similarly, in the 
Scotia-Fundy region of coastal Canada, fishers became more involved in the management and 
monitoring of marine resources by participating in fisher’s association (Wiber et al. 2004). 
Furthermore, inland fishers in Bangladesh who participated in a community-based fisheries 
management (CBFM) regime had greater access to fisheries resources and improved livelihoods 
compared to non-CBFM participating fishers (Islam and Yew 2013), demonstrating the 
livelihood benefits of participatory fisheries management.  
 
Complexity in information transfer and collaboration between institutions 
However promising Ostrom’s CPR design principles are in Belize, there is incredible 
complexity in information transfer and collaboration between institutions, which has 
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implications on management, economy, environment, and institutional stability. Often, different 
sectors work together and act as nested enterprises (McCabe and Feiock 2005b, Ostrom et al. 
2010). One example of that is The Nature Conservancy working closely with ResCa (both 
NGOs) to improve the seafood market traceability of the fishers who sell their product at the 
National Fishermen Cooperative. They are maximizing on the economic incentive of fishers to 
accurately report their catch. Through this, they are making up for shortcomings in the logbook 
reporting process by the Belize Fisheries Department. This is an example of smaller scale 
institutions (the NGOs and cooperatives) filling the gaps that exist in the government’s capacity 
to accurately conduct stock assessments. It is therefore imperative for policymakers to receive 
accurate numbers of catch per unit effort (CPUE) by fishers so they may set feasible and data-
driven catch limits (Schiermeir 2002, Reddy et al. 2013, Carruthers et al. 2014).  
 The membership of the Belize Federation of Fishers (BFF) is another example of 
complex institutional cross-over and information transfer. Those who serve on the leadership 
board of BFF are also in positions of power in the fisher associations and serve on the MA 
committees. They are therefore in charge of deciding who gets commercial licenses for their 
areas and are involved in advocating for their communities on a national level. By nature of this 
design, there is exclusion from the benefits of BFF organization. Fishers who are not members of 
fisher associations and fisher associations not members of BFF are excluded from the advocacy 
benefits provided by BFF. Furthermore, there are certain costs and benefits to having the same 
individuals serving on BFF for multiple years. Having the same individuals involved provides 
the benefits of improved information transfer, maintained trust, and not many changes in the 
structure, e.g., shocks (Wiber et al. 2004, Foley 2012, Wade et al. 2019). On the other hand, 
having the same individuals in these positions excludes others from the chance of being 
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involved, therefore leading to uneven representation, exclusion, and missing voices (Bodwitch 
2017). It could also increase the likelihood of corruption and biases in decision-making, as the 
same individuals making the decisions could be advancing their own agenda(s) rather than 
advancing the needs of the collective “group” they represent (Hanich and Tsamenyi 2009, Cross 
2016, Nunan et al. 2018, Semitiel-García and Noguera-Méndez 2019).  
There is also a connection between fishers, the tourism industry, and the government, 
because many fishers, particularly those in southern Belize, are also tour guides. By becoming 
tour guides, fishers become stewards of their local environment, sharing their knowledge of the 
marine system with others (Bennett et al. 2018). However, such opportunities are highly 
location-specific and not available for all commercial fishers across Belize. This discrepancy 
leads to conflict among fishers in the same or neighboring communities (sources: key informant 
interviews, participant observation). Furthermore, to work as tour guides, fishers must attend 
training sessions and receive their license from the Belize Tourism Board (BTB) and the Belize 
Tourism Industry Association (BTIA). The license and training are also pretty costly, and require 
annual fees to be renewed. These policies demonstrate the integration between the governmental, 
tourism and fisheries sectors, but also that becoming a fisher-tour guide has its own slew of 
complexities in policies and agency.  
 
Conclusion 
This case study demonstrates that over 40 years, Belize has developed polycentric, 
decentralized and nested institutions to sustainably manage its fisheries and coastal resources. 
This variety in governance structure can potentially lead to Belize overcoming the collective 
action problems associated with its fisheries being a common pool resource system (Olson 1965, 
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Ostrom 1990, Ostrom et al. 1999, Ostrom 2003, Levine and Richmond 2015). The partnerships 
across scale between local NGOs, fishers’ associations, and the federal government are examples 
of cross-scale linkages that contribute to overall institutional stability, robustness, and improved 
information transfer across scale (Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009). All actors of this resource 
system are encouraged to engage in collective action to reach shared sustainability goals 
(Urquhart et al. 2014, Valdés-pizzini et al. 2016). However, due to the lack of widespread and 
equitable representation of fishers in the management process of the MA program, I cannot 
conclude that the program is an example of participatory management. An additional challenge 
to sustainable fisheries management in Belize is the implementation of the new Fisheries 
Resources Bill in the coming years, which will require long-term buy-in by the fisherfolk and 





Figure 2. 1: Timeline of significant milestones in coastal zone/fisheries management in Belize 
from 1980 to present. Top panel shows 1980-2000 while the bottom panel shows 2000-2020. 




Figure 2. 2: Managed Access fishing areas in Belize. The polygons represent MPAs. The two 
pilot sites established in 2011 were: Area 5 (in red), the Port Honduras Marine Reserve (PHMR), 
and Area 8 (in grey), the Glovers Reef Marine Reserve (GRMR). The remaining Areas were 




Figure 2. 3: Visual depiction of the different sectors involved in fisheries management in Belize. 





Figure 2. 4: Visual depiction of the governmental agencies involved in fisheries management in 
Belize. Each governmental organization is nested within a Ministry. The Belize Tourism Board 
(BTB) is also represented in the tourism sector. Asterisk indicates statutory body. Sources: key 





Figure 2. 5: Visual depiction of the tourism institutions involved in fisheries in Belize. Asterisk 
indicates statutory body in the government sector. Sources: key informant interviews, participant 





Figure 2. 6: Visual depiction of the environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
involved in fisheries management in Belize. About half of them are local to a community in 
Belize, while the other half are international organizations with local chapters. Asterisk indicates 
an organization is a co-manager of a marine reserve (with the Belize Fisheries Department). 





Figure 2. 7: Visual depiction of the fishers’ organizations in fisheries management in Belize. 
Note this figure primarily focuses on the commercial fishing sector. Asterisk indicates Fisher 
Associations as members of the Belize Federation of Fishers (BFF). Sources: key informant 




Figure 2. 8: Depiction of the institutions (and individuals) involved in the co-management of the 
Managed Access program in Belize. Red indicates the governmental sector. Blue represents 
marine reserves and/or protected areas. Green represents the NGO sector. Purple represents the 
fishers’ sector. Arrows indicate the roles and information transfer between the levels. Sources: 




Table 2. 1: Ostrom’s design principles for long-enduring CPRs applied to Belize’s marine 










Belize's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the eight 
distinct MA areas where commercial fishers are granted 
access/ownership rights. 
Foley et al. 2012, 












The existence of MA committees, where fishers can serve 
and represent the interests of their communities. Local, 
community-based NGOs are co-managers of marine 
reserves. Fishers organizations and BFF represent the 
interests of fishers on local and national scales. 
Belize Fisheries 
Department 2015 








Fishers serving on MA committees can provide input about 
who gets MA license in subsequent years. Fishers also 
consulted during the development of MA and rewriting of 
the Fisheries Resources Bill. However, BFD has final say 
about how the resource units get accessed and used. 
Belize Fisheries 
Department 2015 








Majority of the monitoring and enforcement are done by 
Fisheries Officers at BFD and NGOs. But, fishers are pretty 
aware of transboundary fishers/notice a non-licensed user in 
their area. Potential for fishers to increase monitoring of 









Currently, there is a 3-strike rule by BFD (first is a verbal 
warning, second is a written warning, and third is an arrest). 
However, the Fisheries Resource Bill is much stricter 
(infractions, evidence, being charged, possible jail time). If a 
fisher has an infraction, they may not be able to get 
commercial license next year (as decided by MA committee) 
Belize Fisheries 
Department 2015 







Fisher forums, which occur at least once a year between all 
marine stakeholders of each MA area, offer a place for 
information sharing between co-managers and fishers. 
However, from my participant observation, not all fishers 
attend, only a few vocal fishers voice concerns, sometimes 










of rights to 
Government recognizes active fishers' organizations, BFF 
and cooperatives and does not challenge the rights of the 












Figure 8 depicts highly nested enterprises involved in 
governing the MA program. Fishers from local communities 
are often represented by fishers' associations, which 
advocate for them at regional and national levels. NGOs are 
local to villages and regions, but often serve on national 
committees. Included in the 2019 Fisheries Resources Bill is 
the development of a Fisheries Council, which will be an 
advisory body consisting of individuals representing the 
governmental, tourism, fisheries and NGO sectors, as well 


















CHAPTER 3: TWENTY YEARS OF BENTHIC COMMUNITY CHANGES ACROSS 




Coral reefs worldwide have experienced remarkable changes over the past 50 years, 
including the loss of reef-building corals and large predatory fishes (Gardner et al. 2003, Bruno 
and Selig 2007, Mora 2008, Schutte et al. 2010, Valdivia et al. 2017) This has caused a reduction 
in or effective loss of essential ecological functions including reef accretion (Perry et al. 2013, 
Cramer et al. 2017), and the provisioning of habitat and fishery production (Kuffner and Toth 
2016). Given the substantial economic and cultural value of healthy reefs (Spalding et al. 2017), 
this degradation is affecting coastal human communities that depend on reefs for food, income, 
and protection from storms (Ferrario et al. 2014).  
Numerous factors are responsible for the well-documented degradation of Caribbean 
reefs. Acroporid corals, that dominated Caribbean reefs for millions of years, experienced 90-
95% mortality due to white-band disease in the 1980s (Aronson & Precht 2001). This disease, 
likely exacerbated by ocean warming (Randall and Van Woesik 2015), coupled with increased 
hurricane frequency and intensity (Webster et al. 2005, Elsner et al. 2008, Emanuel 2013), 
reduced the habitat complexity, or rugosity, of Caribbean reefs (Alvarez-Filip et al. 2009). Other 
disease syndromes have greatly reduced the cover of other coral taxa, including yellow band 
                                                 
2 A version of this chapter is in review in Marine Ecology Progress Series as Alves, C., N. Bood, K. Castillo, C. 
Cox, C. Fieseler, Z. Locklear, M. McField, L. Mudge, J. Umbanhowar, A. Valdivia, R. Aronson, J. Bruno. Twenty 
years of benthic community changes across the Belize Mesoamerican Barrier Reef. 
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disease (Orbicella spp.) and stony coral tissue loss disease (Dendrogyra cylindrus, 
Pseudodiploria strigosa, Meandrina meandrites, Eusmilia fastigiate, Siderastrea sidereal and 
Diploria labyrinthiformis, (Alvarez-Filip et al. 2019). Coral bleaching and other manifestations 
of ocean warming (including increased disease severity) are also a primary cause of Caribbean 
coral loss (Aronson et al. 2002b, Eakin et al. 2010). On a local scale, eutrophication via nutrient 
input and increased sedimentation from coastal development affect coral reefs by increasing 
turbidity, which contributes to coral smothering and loss of light (Gil 2013, Silbiger et al. 2018).  
Finally, centuries of fishing have caused an 80-95% reduction in large predatory fish biomass 
across the Caribbean (Valdivia et al. 2017). Secondary drivers include factors that enabled the 
observed increase in macroalgae (fleshy seaweeds), including the removal of competitively 
dominant Scleractinian corals, the subsequent freeing up of space and other resources, and the 
loss of reef herbivores, particularly the sea urchin Diadema antillarum (Carpenter 1988), and 
herbivorous fishes due to overfishing in some locations.  
The primary management response to reef degradation has been the implementation of 
marine protected areas (MPAs) (Gaines et al. 2010, Mumby and Harborne 2010, Selig and Bruno 
2010, Lamb et al. 2015). MPAs and MPA networks designate areas where extractive fishing 
behaviors are regulated via fishing closures or gear restrictions. Within those MPAs, fish 
abundances and diversity often increase, and in some cases, spill over into adjacent non-
protected areas (Gaines et al. 2010, Chirico et al. 2017). Fishers reap the benefits of increased 
fish size and abundance via catch-share programs, access rights and fishing licenses, oftentimes 
fishing in the areas near or within the MPAs (Gaines et al. 2010, Anderson and Uchida 2014). 
However, poaching, lack of enforcement, inadequate fishing regulations, and limited spillover 
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often contribute to the failure of MPAs to protect fish populations (Coelho 2007, Graham et al. 
2008, Huntington et al. 2011, Cox et al. 2017, Gill et al. 2017, Bruno et al. 2019).  
The purpose of this study was to measure changes to benthic communities within the 
Belize Mesoamerican Barrier Reef (BMBR) from 1997 to 2016 and determine whether such 
changes were related to reef-site protection status, local human impacts, and ocean temperatures 
anomalies. We compiled data from benthic surveys conducted in 1997, 1999, 2005, 2009 and 
2016 (McField et al. 2001, Bood 2006, Cox et al. 2017) to describe how reef benthic 
communities in the BMBR have changed over time and identify the drivers of those changes. 
Our results indicate shifts in benthic community state between early and late sampling years, 
highlighting the shortcomings of MPA networks in the BMBR in mitigating coral loss and 




Scientists have tracked coral reef community composition across Belize for the last 60 
years, mostly through short-term longitudinal studies ( Stoddart 1969, 1974, 1961, Aronson & 
Precht 1997, 2001, McClanahan and Muthiga 1998, McField et al. 2001, Aronson et al. 2002a, 
2005, 2012, Huntington et al. 2011, Rodríguez-Martínez et al. 2014, Cox et al. 2017). Belize has 
an extensive 30-plus-year-old MPA network (Cox et al. 2017) and a history of disturbances 
(Table 3.1). Belize also hosts 55% of the reef area of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System 
(MBRS), the second-largest barrier reef in the world.  
We surveyed fore-reef benthic communities (15–18 m depth) at 21 sites along the BMBR 
system during the summer months in 1997, 1999, 2005, 2009, and 2016 (Figure 3.1; Table 
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A3.1). This reef zone was surveyed because it has been widely studied in Belize and is fairly 
convenient: surveys are not affected by wave action, it is not so deep that surveys are limited by 
dive time, and similar spur-and-grove zones are found across the barrier-reef system. Study sites 
were selected to maximize spatial heterogeneity and include a range of protection or 
management zones (McField et al. 2001, Bood 2006, Cox et al. 2017). These management 
protections include (1) fully protected zones where only non-extractive activities were permitted 
(FP), (2) general-use zones with restrictions placed on certain gear types and other fishing 
regulations (GU), and (3) non-protected zones (NP) where fishing is not restricted (Cox et al. 
2017). Because of logistical constraints we did not survey all sites each year, except for three of 
the 21 sites (Bacalar Chico, Middle Caye, and Tacklebox; Table A3.1). We removed data from 
study sites that were sampled only once. 
  
Benthic surveys 
Benthic surveys were conducted by video-transecting or photography. At each site, dive 
teams laid out 25 m x 2 m belt transects along the individual spurs. The transects usually began 
on or near the shoulders of the spurs in 13–17 m depth, shoreward of the drop-off. Between four 
and 10 transects were sampled per site per year. Divers worked in buddy pairs, where one diver 
laid out the transect tape and the other used a digital camera in an underwater housing to obtain 
videos and still-frames of the benthos. At each site, we photographed or videotaped the belt 
transects at a standard distance of 25 cm above the benthos using a horizontal bar projected from 
the front of the camera housing (Aronson et al. 1994, Murdoch and Aronson 1999, McField et al. 
2001, Bood 2006). In all sampling years except 2016, we obtained underwater videos along the 
belt transects and extracted still frames from those videos (outlined below). In 2016, we 
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photographed the transects using a GoPro Hero4 by swimming at a rate of 5–7 minutes/30 m and 
taking a photograph every five seconds. 
 
Image extraction and analysis 
We used several techniques to extract and analyze the benthic images from the 
underwater transects over the course of this study, primarily due to changes in imaging 
technology and analysis software. For sampling years 1997, 1999 and 2005, we obtained Hi-8 
video footage from each transect, using two 30-watt ultrabright lights for illumination. From the 
video footage, we randomly frame-grabbed, processed (de-interlaced, sharpened, enhanced) and 
saved onto a CD-ROM 50 images per transect (McField et al. 2001, Bood 2006). In 2009, we 
obtained video footage from underwater transects using a digital camera in an underwater 
housing. Years later, we extracted the images from the video footage at a rate of 1-fps using 
Adobe Premiere Pro CC 2014. We ran the images through the Automator program on OS-X 
software to select every third, fifth or seventh image, depending on the length (in time) of the 
transect. We analyzed 15 images/transect/site for 2009 and 2016 sampling years because we 
could still obtain a similar level of inference about community composition with 15 images 
rather than the 50 recommended by Aronson et al. (1994; J. Bruno, pers. comm.). To select 15 
images per transect/site from 2009 and 2016, we automated the process using a code in R version 
3.6.3 (RStudio Team 2016), to randomly chose, copy and paste 15 images into a new folder from 
our source folder of all images. 
We analyzed the benthic cover of images from 1997–2005 using the Coral Point Count 
software (Kohler & Gill 2006), and from 2009 and 2016 using CoralNet (Beijbom et al. 2012, 
2015). We manually input species-level benthic identifications for each of 10 random points 
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overlaid on all images. When species-level identifications were not possible, benthic components 
were identified to genus or family. All benthic component identified were pooled into six key 
benthic categories (crustose coralline algae, CCA; Halimeda, a genus of calcareous green algae; 
hard coral; macroalgae; soft coral, and sponges). Orbicella annularis, O. favelota, and O. 
franksii were pooled as Orbicella spp. because the species distinction did not occur during 1997 
and 1999 data collection. In all instances, image-level point-count data were converted to 
percent-cover estimates, and we calculated overall mean percent covers for each site and year. 
 
Identifying potential drivers of benthic community dynamics 
We estimated local human impacts using the global Human Influence Index (HII) data 
from NASA’s Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC) database (WCS and 
CIESIN 2005). We extracted sea surface temperature (SST) metrics obtained from NOAA’s 
Coral Reef Temperature Anomaly Database (CoRTAD) (Selig et al. 2010). We extracted HII 
data for the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef Region (Figure A3.1) to estimate local anthropogenic 
stress to the BMBR. The HII is a global dataset of 1-km grid cells aggregated from 1995–2004 
quantifying an index for human influence by estimating human population pressure, human land 
use and infrastructure, and human access. Higher values represent higher Human Influence 
Indices, and therefore can be used as a proxy for local human impacts on coral reefs. We 
downloaded the HII global dataset from SEDAC for the MBRS (WCS and CIESIN 2005). Then, 
we extracted accumulative HII data (sum of data per pixel) within several buffers (10, 25, 50, 75, 
100 km) from the center-coordinates of each study site (Table A3.1, Figure A3.1). 
The CoRTAD dataset contains approximately 4-km-resolution SST data on a weekly 
time scale from 1982 to 2017. We examined four metrics of thermal-stress anomalies (TSA) 
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from Version 6 of the CoRTAD database to determine the impact of temperature on benthic 
communities along the BMBR: (1) TSA, the SST minus the maximum of weekly mean 
climatological SST calculated over the data range, (2) frequency of TSA (“TSA_Freq”), defined 
by the number of instances TSA was over 1 °C over the previous 52 weeks, (3) the frequency of 
TSA between survey years (“TSA_Freq_btw_surveys”), defined as the number of instances since 
the previous survey year that TSA was over 1 °C, and (4) the accumulative TSA 
(“TSA_Freq_hist”), represented by the number of times since the beginning of the dataset (1982) 
to survey year that TSA was over 1 °C (Table A3.2, Figure A3.2). Because the CoRTAD TSA 
dataset was very large, we used a shell script to run the Climate Data Operator (CDO) command 
to extract all raster data layers within a geographic boundary around Belize (from -85 to -89° 
longitude, and 15 to 19° latitude). We then extracted TSA, TSA_Freq, TSA_Freq_btw_surveys, 
and TSA_Freq_hist for our study sites using the following R packages: raster (Hijmans 2019), 
ncdf4 (Pierce 2019), maptools (Bivand & Lewin-Koh 2019) and formatR (Xie 2019).  
 
Statistical analysis 
To examine benthic community compositional changes over temporal and spatial scales 
and identify potential drivers of such changes, we constructed six generalized linear mixed 
models (GLMM) using the lme4 package (Bates et al. 2015). The response variables were the 
logit-transformed percent cover of the six key benthic categories of interest. The final models 
had survey year, protection level (protected = FP, and unprotected = UP), HII at 50-km buffer, 
and TSA_Freq as fixed effects, and site as a random effect. All predictor variables were additive, 
and the maximum likelihood estimation was used to fit to the data. We chose to pool NP and GU 
into an “unprotected” category because we were most interested in seeing the impact of full 
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closures (fishing not allowed) on benthic community structure, and because there is minimal 
operational difference between GU and NP areas in Belize. Prior to fitting models, we rescaled 
and centered all fixed effects to optimize comparisons among variables.  
We performed several exploratory tests to find the best-model fit. The models we 
compared each had different metrics for cumulative thermal stress (TSA_Freq, 
TSA_Freq_btw_surveys, and TSA_Freq_hist), and HII at 50 km and 100 km. We evaluated 
competing models by comparing Akaike information criterion (AIC) values (Table 3), and 
ultimately chose the TSA_Freq model, as it was the most parsimonious model with the lowest 
AIC. Other studies have found that TSA_Freq is a significant predictor of coral-cover loss and 
coral-disease prevalence (Bruno and Selig 2007, Selig et al. 2010, Maina et al. 2011). The HII at 
50 km was included because all sites and years had HII at that buffer, and because it is 
understood that most fishers and tour operators are less likely to travel past 50 km from a coastal 
town in a day trip (Mora 2008). We tested for homoscedasticity (equal variance across predictor 
variables) by plotting residuals versus fitted values. Observations were normally distributed with 
no evidence of heteroscedasticity. Comparing fitted and residual values showed that our linear 
models were reasonable models of the means. We also examined the marginal and conditional R-
squared values of the model(s). An example of the final model for hard coral is below. 
 
Logit (coral cover)ij = α + β1j  Yearij + β2j  Protectionij + β3j  HIIij + β4j  TSA_Freqij + αi+ eij 
 
Where α = intercept, αi = random intercept (Site), eij = error term and β 1j – β 4j are the 
coefficient estimates for covariates. The logit-transformed coral cover is modeled as an intercept 
(α), plus a linear year effect, protection level effect, HII effect, TSA_Freq effect, and a random 
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intercept (αi) for site, that is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 0 and variance 
σα2, and an error (eij). The index i refers to sites (i = 1, …, 16) and j to the year of survey (j = 
1997, …, 2016). The term eij is the within-site variance of coral cover, and is assumed to be 
independently normally distributed with mean of 0 and a variance of σ2.  
We also used analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine if the mean percent cover of 
coral genera varied significantly over time. To examine further the changes in community 
composition of all benthic species – not just coral genera – within sites and across years, we 
constructed non-metric multidimensional scaling (NMDS) ordinations using the vegan package 
in R (Oksanen et al. 2019). We used the Bray–Curtis dissimilarity matrix to calculate distances 
among species-level cover data because it handles large quantities of zeros (or absences) 
commonly found in ecological data and does not consider shared absences as being similar 
(Legendre and Legendre 2012). To determine significant differences among groups, we ran the 
Adonis test, a statistical test of dissimilarity between observational groups at the site and year 
levels, using the vegan package (Oksanen et al. 2019). All predictor variables (HII at 50 km 
buffer, TSA_Freq, Year, and Protection level) were included in this function, which conducts a 
multivariate analysis of variance using distance matrices. All statistical analyses were done in R 
version 3.6.3 (RStudio Team 2016), and the code and raw data are available in GitHub. 
 
Results 
Overall loss of hard coral and increase in macroalgae 
Among the six benthic groups of interest [crustose coralline algae (CCA), Halimeda, 
hard-coral, macroalgae, soft coral (gorgonians), and sponges], we identified a significant decline 
in hard-coral cover (Table 3.2, coefficient estimate = -0.551, p < 0.001) an increase in CCA 
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(Table 3.2, coefficient estimate = 0.221, p = 0.034), macroalgae (Table 3.2, coefficient estimate 
= 1.88, p < 0.001), and soft coral cover (Table 3.2, coefficient estimate = 0.447, p < 0.001) over 
the duration of the study (Figures 3.2–3.4, Table 3.2). 
 
Role of protection status, frequency of Thermal Stress Anomalies, and Human Influence Index 
on benthic cover 
There was no effect of protection level on the total mean percent cover of hard coral 
(Table 3.2, coefficient estimate = 0.099, p = 0.562) or macroalgae between fully protected (“FP”) 
sites versus unprotected (“NP”, UP and GU zones; Table 3.2, coefficient estimate = -0.016, p = 
0.946). Even fully protected (“FP”) areas experienced loss of hard coral cover and increased 
macroalgae cover (Figures 3.2–3.4).  
We also found a strong, negative correlation between TSA_Freq and hard coral (Table 
3.2, coefficient estimate = -0.464, p < 0.001), macroalgae (Table 3.2, estimate = -0.808, p < 
0.001), soft coral (Table 3.2, coefficient estimate = -0.307, p = 0.004), and sponges (Table 3.2, 
coefficient estimate = -0.207, p = 0.009). Sites with high HII showed lower cover of soft coral 
(Table 3.2, coefficient estimate = -0.281, p = 0.0213) and sponges (Table 3.2, coefficient 
estimate = -0.161, p = 0.0396). None of our environmental predictors were associated with 
observed changes in Halimeda cover (Table 3.2, Figures 3.2–3.4).  
 
Distinct benthic assemblages between early and late sampling years 
There were species-specific compositional shifts in the dominant benthic assemblages 
between 1997 and 2016, as indicated by the non-metric multidimensional scaling (NMDS; 
Figures 3.5 and A3.3). Every study site sampled in multiple years expressed shifts in the 
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dominant benthic communities over time (Figure A3.3). Among all explanatory variables (HII at 
50 km buffer, TSA_Freq, Year, and Protection level) included in the statistical test of 
dissimilarity between treatment/observational groups (Adonis test), Year was the only significant 
predictor of shift in community composition (R2 = 0.31295, F=15.0654, p < 0.001). The NMDS 
plot revealed a significant difference in species composition between earlier sampling years 
(1997–2005) on the right along MDS1, and our later sampling years (2009 and 2016) on the left, 
spread across MDS2 (Figure 3.5). For instance, Acropora and Orbicella corals were more-often 
present and more dominant in early sampling years, as opposed to turf algae, Pseudodiploria 
clivosa, and Dictyota macroalgae in later sampling years (Figure 3.5).  
 
Trends of coral species over time 
Throughout the two decades of this study, we documented significant decline of the hard-
coral genus Orbicella — including O. annularis, O. franksi and O. faveolata, grouped together 
as “Orbicella complex” — with mean cover at 4.24 % (± 0.0051) in 1997 to 0.75 % (± 0.0020) 
in 2016 (Figure 3.6, Table 3.4, F = 18.80, p < 0.001). The mean cover of Agaricia grahamae 
significantly increased from zero in 1997 to 0.21 % (± 0.0026) in 2016 (Figure 3.6, Table 4, F = 
7.35, p = 0.0096), likely due to improved survey identification. Trends in the cover of other coral 
species remained relatively stable throughout this study (Figure 3.6, Table 3.4).  
 
Discussion 
Our findings demonstrate an overall shortcoming of the BMBR MPA network in 
mitigating the degradation of benthic reef assemblages following the disturbances that occurred 
before and after 1997. We document a statistically significant decline in hard-coral cover, and an 
increase in macroalgae and soft corals, regardless of management regime. Even the oldest and 
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most protected sites (where fishing is fully restricted) experienced hard-coral loss and macroalgal 
increase. This conclusion is concordant with a majority of studies that have found MPAs to be 
ineffective at mitigating the decline of corals in response to large-scale disturbances including 
disease, bleaching, and storms (McClanahan et al. 2001, Coelho 2007, Graham et al. 2008, 
McClanahan 2008, Huntington et al. 2011, Toth et al. 2014, de Bakker et al. 2017). Our study 
contributes to the growing body of literature indicating that MPAs provide little protection to 
coral populations, even if they are successful in increasing fish populations. Although we did not 
examine fish biomass across sites in this study, Cox et al. (2017) found no effect of fisheries 
restrictions on preventing loss of coral cover nor promoting reef fish biomass from 2009–2013 
along the BMBR MPA network.  
We found ecologically distinct benthic assemblages between early (1997, 1999, 2005) 
and late sampling years (2009, 2016). Time (year) was statistically significantly related (Table 
3.3) to observed changes in benthic composition (unlike protection level, HII, and TSA_Freq 
which were not). For instance, Acropora and Orbicella corals were more-often present and more 
dominant in the early sampling years, as opposed to turf algae, the fleshy brown macroalga 
Dictyota, and the hard-coral P. clivosa in later sampling years. In contrast, living cover of 
“weedy” coral taxa such as Porites and Agaricia spp. remained relatively consistent throughout 
the course of the study. The decline in Orbicella spp. was likely due to mortality from coral 
bleaching in 1998 (Aronson et al. 2002a, 2002b, 2005, Miller et al. 2009, Eakin et al. 2010, 
Villamizar et al. 2014, Neal et al. 2017) and yellow band disease in the early 2000s. The 
ecological extinction of the two once-dominant BMBR coral genera (Acropora and Orbicella) 
has dramatically changed the structure and functioning of this unique regional ecosystem.  
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Our results are concordant with previous studies in Belize that documented shifts in hard-
coral and macroalgal abundance from the 1970s to 1996 (McClanahan and Muthiga 1998). The 
patch reefs of Glovers Reef atoll had 80% hard coral and 20% algae cover in 1970–1971 but 
phase-shifted to 20% hard coral and 80% algae cover by 1996–1997 (McClanahan and Muthiga 
1998). This was due to declines in the reef-building corals A. cervicornis, A. palmata, and O. 
annularis (formerly Montastrea annularis), as well as reductions in herbivores and spongivores 
(Pawlik et al. 2018). Prior to the beginning of our study, Acroporid abundance declined in Belize 
(Aronson and Precht 2001, Rodríguez-Martínez et al. 2014), thus we did not document some of 
the earlier, and likely more dramatic community shifts. At Channel Cay shoal, Belize, for 
example, A. cervicornis was replaced mostly by Agaricia tenuifolia (Aronson & Precht 1997), 
but then subsequently by sponges following the 1998 mass-bleaching event (Aronson et al. 
2002b). A longitudinal study of A. palmata along the Mexican part of the Mesoamerican Barrier 
Reef System also indicated declines in acroporids with A. palmata decreasing from 7.7% in 1985 
to 2.9% in 2012 (Rodríguez-Martínez et al. 2014). We documented the decline of O. annularis, 
and the failure of the formerly dominant acroporid species to recover post-disease, even after 20 
years. The observed increase in macroalgae is concordant with other studies in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s in Belize, which also documented macroalgal increases, principally by the genus 
Lobophora (McClanahan & Muthiga 1998). 
Similar shifts in the dominant benthic assemblages have been documented across the 
Caribbean, followed by the failure of the reefs to recover following disturbances (Gardner et al. 
2003, Bruno et al. 2009, Schutte et al. 2010, Toth et al. 2014, Hughes et al. 2018b, 2018a, 
Steneck et al. 2019). Across seven subregions in the Caribbean, Schutte et al. (2010) found 
significant declines in hard-coral cover and increases in macroalgal cover from 1970–2005. In 
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the Florida Keys (Toth et al. 2014), and in the U.S. Virgin Islands (Edmunds & Elahi 2007), 
stony corals failed to recover, with declines associated with the decline in O. annularis following 
the 1999 and 2000 El Niño events. The coral reefs in Bonaire exhibited similar trends over 15 
years of bleaching, storms, and diseases, with a 22% decline in coral cover and an 18% increase 
in macroalgal cover by 2017 (Steneck et al. 2019).  These trends were also apparent in our study.  
We measured the potential effects of several putative drivers of the observed 
compositional shifts, including local human impacts estimated using the Human Influence Index 
(HII) and the frequencies of Thermal Stress Anomalies (TSA_Freq). HII was variable across the 
BMBR (Table A3.1, Figure A3.1), suggesting variability in local human pressure. TSA_Freq 
differentially affected in space and time throughout the study (Table A3.1, Figure A3.2). We 
found that soft-coral and sponge cover were significantly lower on sites where HII was higher, 
suggesting that these taxa may be more susceptible to local human stressors than CCA, 
Halimeda, macroalgae, and hard corals (Mora 2008). TSA_Freq was significantly negatively 
associated with the cover of hard corals, macroalgae, soft corals, and sponges. These findings are 
concordant with other studies that have documented coral mortalities and subsequent declines in 
coral cover following the temperature-induced bleaching events in 1998 (Peter J. Mumby 1999, 
McField et al. 2001, Aronson et al. 2002b) and 2005 (Miller et al. 2009, Eakin et al. 2010, 
Villamizar et al. 2014, Neal et al. 2017).  
Several major disturbances have impacted coral reefs across the BMBR since 1997, 
including two mass bleaching events, three hurricanes, and a reef-damaging earthquake (Table 
3.1). We suggest that these disturbances accelerated the temporal shifts in community types we 
observed between 2005 and 2009. In the summer of 1998, corals across the globe experienced 
bleaching caused by widespread thermal anomalies due to ocean warming (Bruno et al. 2001, 
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Aronson et al. 2002b). Not long after the summer 1998 bleaching event, three major storms—
Hurricane Mitch in October 1998, Hurricane Keith in October 2000, and tropical cyclone Iris in 
October 2001 (Aronson et al. 2002b, 2005) —struck Belize’s coastline, resulting in additional 
damage to the already-impacted reef system. In 2005, another temperature-induced mass 
bleaching event occurred across the Caribbean (Eakin et al. 2010), resulting in disease and 
mortality of Orbicella spp. (Miller et al. 2009), a lack of recovery by many species in some 
locations (Neal et al. 2017), and further shifts in the benthic communities (Villamizar et al. 
2014). Then, in August 2007, Hurricane Dean struck the coast of Mexico, bringing strong winds 
and impacts to the Belizean coast (San Pedro Sun 2007). To round out the decade, Belize 
experienced an earthquake in May 2009, which resulted in the avalanching and fracturing of 
reefs in the shelf-lagoon (Aronson et al. 2012). The aftermath of the earthquake was marked by 
an increase in sediment cover and declines of already low hard coral cover.  
Our study documents a shift in the dominant benthic communities across the Belize 
Barrier Reef following decades of disturbances and demonstrates an overall shortcoming of 
MPAs at mitigating those impacts. Although we began sampling after a majority of the recent 
disturbances to Caribbean coral reefs, we documented a decline in Orbicella spp., which drove 
increases in macroalgal and soft-coral cover and distinguished the benthic assemblages of 1997–
2005 from those of 2009–2016. The benthic communities along the BMBR have experienced 
local, regional, and global impacts, which contributed to the reef assemblages we see today. Our 
study provides insight into extent of influence of local and regional stressors at a time of rapid 
climate change, which will help managers improve their decision-making strategies. We are 
optimistic that scientists can work with natural-resource managers to develop actionable 
recommendations to improve the governance and enforcement of well-designed networks of 
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MPAs. We recommend continued research using long-term monitoring data to identify patterns 
in community composition across temporal and spatial scales. These longitudinal studies can 
identify taxa and functional groups that persist through disturbances and, therefore, could be a 
focus of future management efforts. We encourage adaptive management strategies at local 
scales to extend past managers working closely with scientists and include more widespread 
participation by fishers and local users to ensure long-term sustainability. Finally, we 
recommend global mitigation of carbon emissions to improve the health of reef communities 




Table 3. 1: Timeline of disturbances to the Belize Mesoamerican Barrier Reef  
 
Year Disturbance References 
1980s Acroporid-specific white band disease Aronson & Precht 2001 
1980 Diadema-specific disease Carpenter 1988, Edmunds & Carpenter 
2001, Mumby 2009 
1998 Temperature-induced coral bleaching Aronson et al. 2002a, Aronson et al. 2002b 
1998 Hurricane Mitch Jackson et al. 2014 
2001 Tropical Cyclone Iris Aronson et al. 2005 
2005 Temperature-induced coral bleaching Miller et al. 2009, Eakin et al. 2010, 
Villamizar et al. 2014, Neal et al. 2017 
2007 Hurricane Dean San Pedro Sun 2007 
2009 Earthquake Aronson et al. 2012 
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Table 3. 2: Estimated regression parameters, standard error, F statistic, and p-value from the final 
generalized linear mixed models for each benthic group of interest. Significance codes: 0; ***, 
0.001; **, 0.01, *, 0.05; 0.1; 1. 
Benthic Group and 
Fixed Effects Estimate Standard error F statistic p-value 
CCA 
(Intercept) -3.41   <0.001*** 
Year 0.221 0.110 2.02 0.043 * 
Protected vs. Not 
Protected -0.023 0.113 -0.207 0.836 
Hii at 50 km -0.028 0.112 -0.252 0.801 
TSA_Freq 0.057 0.111 0.516 0.606 
Marginal R2 =0.090; Conditional R2 = NA 
Halimeda 
(Intercept) -3.33   <0.001*** 
Year 0.222 0.122 1.83 0.068 
Protected vs. Not 
Protected 0.202 0.126 1.61 0.108 
Hii at 50 km 0.225 0.124 1.81 0.071 
TSA_Freq 0.053 0.123 0.427 0.670 
Marginal R2 = 0.215; Conditional R2 = NA 
Hard Coral 
(Intercept) -1.78   <0.001*** 
Year -0.551 0.095 -5.78 7.55E-09 *** 
Protected vs. Not 
Protected 0.099 0.171 0.580 0.562 
Hii at 50 km 0.238 0.166 1.43 0.153 
TSA_Freq -0.464 0.103 -4.50 6.94E-06 *** 
Marginal R2 = 0.472; Conditional R2 = 0.669 
Macroalgae 
(Intercept) -1.51   <0.001*** 
Year 1.88 0.232 8.10 5.65E-16 *** 
Protected vs. Not 
Protected -0.016 0.240 -0.068 0.946 
Hii at 50 km 0.331 0.237 1.40 0.162 
TSA_Freq -0.808 0.238 -3.39 0.000688 *** 
Marginal R2 = 0.589; Conditional R2 = NA 
Soft Coral 




Year 0.447 0.103 4.36 1.33E-05 *** 
Protected vs. Not 
Protected 0.242 0.125 1.94 0.0519 
Hii at 50 km -0.281 0.122 -2.30 0.0213 * 
TSA_Freq -0.307 0.108 -2.85 0.00441 ** 
Marginal R2 = 0.387; Conditional R2 = 0.447 
Sponge 
(Intercept) -3.16   <0.001*** 
Year 0.028 0.077 0.360 0.718 
Protected vs. Not 
Protected 0.063 0.080 0.787 0.432 
Hii at 50 km -0.161 0.078 -2.06 0.0396 * 
TSA_Freq -0.207 0.079 -2.62 0.00866 ** 
Marginal R2 = 0.210; Conditional R2 = NA 
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Table 3. 3: Summary of model comparisons. For each linear mixed-effect model, the model 
terms, degrees of freedom, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC), log likelihood (LogLik) and deviance are reported. 
 
Approach and Model Terms df AIC BIC LogLik Deviance 
CCA 
Model 1: Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq_btw_surveys + (1|Site) 
45 50.7 63.4 -18.4 36.7 
Model 2: Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq_Hist + (1|Site) 
45 50.2 62.9 -18.1 36.2 
Final Model (3): Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq + (1|Site) 
45 50.7 63.3 -18.3 36.7 
Halimeda      
Model 1: Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq_btw_surveys + (1|Site) 
45 59.6 72.2 -22.8 45.6 
Model 2: Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq_Hist + (1|Site) 
45 60.0 72.6 -23.0 46.0 
Final Model (3): Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq + (1|Site) 
45 60.1 72.7 -23.0 46.1 
Hard Coral 
Model 1: Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq_btw_surveys + (1|Site) 
45 75.8 89.5 -30.9 61.8 
Model 2: Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq_Hist + (1|Site) 
45 79.0 92.7 -32.5 65.0 
Final Model (3): Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq + (1|Site) 
45 63.3 77.0 -24.7 49.3 
Macroalgae 
Model 1: Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq_btw_surveys + (1|Site) 
45 153.
3 
167.0 -69.7 139.3 
Model 2: Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq_Hist + (1|Site) 
45 153.
3 
166.9 -69.6 139.3 
Final Model (3): Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq + (1|Site) 
45 142.
9 
156.6 -64.5 128.9 
Soft Coral 
Model 1: Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq_btw_surveys + (1|Site) 
45 68.4 82.1 -27.2 54.4 
Model 2: Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq_Hist + (1|Site) 
45 65.9 79.5 -25.0 51.9 
Final Model (3): Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq + (1|Site) 
45 61.5 75.2 -23.8 47.5 
Sponge 
Model 1: Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq_btw_surveys + (1|Site) 
45 34.5 48.2 -10.3 20.5 
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Model 2: Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq_Hist + (1|Site) 
45 34.5 48.1 -10.2 20.5 
Final Model (3): Year + Protection + HII.50 + 
TSA_Freq + (1|Site) 




Table 3. 4: Output from analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) testing if mean percent cover of 
hard coral species representing six major genera (Acropora, Agaricia, [Pseudo-]Diploria, 
Orbicella, Porites, and Siderastrea) varied significantly over time. Significance codes: 0; ***, 



















A. agaricites   
Year 1 0.746 0.746 0.858 0.359 
Residuals 43 37.355 0.869   
A. cervicornis  
Year 1 0.246 0.246 3.59 0.065 
Residuals 43 2.954 0.069   
A. grahamae  
Year 1 0.191 0.191 7.36 0.009** 
Residuals 43 1.117 0.026   
A. lamarcki  
Year 1 0.001 0.001 0.195 0.661 
Residuals 43 0.300 0.007   
A. tenuifolia  
Year 1 0.168 0.168 0.465 0.499 
Residuals 43 15.50 0.361   
D. labyrinthiformis  
Year 1 0.048 0.048 0.509 0.479 
Residuals 43 4.050 0.094   
Orbicella complex 
Year 1 36.26 36.26 18.80 8.59e-05*** 
Residuals 43 82.91 1.93   
P. porites complex 
Year 1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.974 
Residuals 178 109.9 0.618   
P. strigosa 
Year 1 0.306 0.306 0.403 0.529 
Residuals 43 32.70 0.760   
Siderastrea spp. 
Year 1 0.041 0.041 1.023 0.317 










Figure 3. 2: Mean percent cover of six benthic categories over time (Year) and across 
management regime (Protection.Code). The “Protection.Code” categories are: (1) fully protected 
zones where only non-extractive activities were permitted (FP), (2) general-use zones with 
restrictions placed on certain gear types (GU), and (3) non-protected zones (NP) where fishing is 




Figure 3. 3: Effect sizes (+ 95% CI) from the GLMMs of all covariates on the six benthic 
categories of interest. Asterisk indicates statistically significant (< 0.05) p value. Vertical grey 







Figure 3. 4: Relationship between logit-transformed percent cover and time. Blue dots and lines 
represent GLMM model estimates over time (continuous), while black dots represent the logit-
transformed percent cover of the six benthic categories plot for each year of the study (discrete). 
Blue shading indicates 95% CI. Time was a significant predictor of changes in the cover of: hard 





Figure 3. 5: Multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) plot depicting species (ID)-level data colored by 
year. Points represent individual sites, arrows and IDs represent the MDS loadings. The Bray-
Curtis dissimilarity matrix was used and the stress value is 0.029. Zoanthid (MDS1 = -0.20, 
MDS2 = 1.5) and Rubble (MDS1 = -0.70, MDS2 = 0.41) were removed from the Figure as they 
distorted the MDS2 axis. Years are colored and labeled in chronological order at the right as 









Figure 3. 6: Mean percent cover of hard coral species across six major genera: Acropora, 








CHAPTER 4: ASSESSING FISHER PERCEPTIONS OF THE TERRITORIAL USER 





Commercial and subsistence fisheries provide livelihoods and fish protein to nearly three 
billion people annually (FAO 2014). This demand has led to overfishing of marine ecosystems, 
which disrupts ecosystem functioning and threatens fisheries sustainability (Jackson et al. 2001, 
Valdivia et al. 2015). As a result, fisheries science is becoming increasingly interdisciplinary to 
develop innovative management strategies to mitigate common-pool resource system (CPRS) 
problems (Dietz 2003, Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009). Fisheries are some of the most 
challenging CPRS for which to develop effective management strategies because they are easily 
sub-tractable and non-excludable (Ostrom 1990). Without effective institutions (i.e. rules and 
enforcement mechanisms) to regulate the extraction of the marine species, users will be inclined 
to overharvest these CPRS (Ostrom 1990 and 2003, Gibson et al. 2005). Sustainable fisheries 
management requires all actors involved to engage in collective action to reach shared 
sustainability objectives for current and future generations (Ostrom 1990, Urquhart et al. 2014, 
Valdés-Pizzini et al. 2016). This puts even more emphasis on the importance of compliance by 
fishers to govern and manage their fisheries for ultimate success (Gibson et al. 2005). 
Community-based fisheries management (CBFM) has emerged as a promising solution to 
the challenges associated with governing the coastal commons by providing a platform where 
                                                 
3 A version of this chapter is in prep for Marine Policy as Alves, C., R. Kramer. Assessing fisher perceptions of the 
territorial user rights for fishing (TURF) program: A case study in Southern Belize. 
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fishers, managers, and communities collaborate to meet collective objectives (Armitage et al. 
2012, Urquhart et al. 2014, Valdés-Pizzini et al. 2016). Ideally, CBFM combines understanding 
fisheries – stocks, populations and extraction methods – and the role humans play in shaping 
these through culture, history, and social structure (Armitage et al. 2012, Urquhart et al. 2014, 
Valdés-Pizzini et al. 2016). This strategy can provide fishers an opportunity to get involved in 
local fisheries governance through participatory management, where fishers report their catch to 
fishing authorities and are included in the decision-making process (Wiber et al. 2004, Islam and 
Yew 2013, Kittinger 2013, Alexander et al. 2015). CBFM must address the current needs of 
society, while not jeopardizing the potential of future generations to benefit from the services 
provided from marine ecosystems. Sustainable fisheries management, therefore seeks to preserve 
the history, livelihoods, economic growth and development and the environment.  
Catch share programs are an example of CBFM strategies that are increasingly common 
in small scale fisheries contexts across the globe (Costello et al. 2008, Birkenbach et al. 2017, 
Karr et al. 2017, White and Costello 2017). They may include territorial user rights for fishing 
(TURFs), where fishers are granted use and access rights to fish in designated areas (Barner et al. 
2015). They may also include an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system where a share of the 
scientifically determined total catch is divided up to fishers, cooperatives, or communities 
(Costello et al. 2008, Harford et al. 2016, Mcdonald et al. 2017, White and Costello 2017). 
Assigning catch shares to fishers can prevent the “race to fish” paradigm because fishers are 
sharing a portion of the total catch between members of their community (Birkenbach et al. 
2017). Catch share programs can also inspire collective action, leading fishers to become 
stewards of their environment. These initiatives may lead to decreased poaching in restricted 
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areas and gradual recovery of fish populations (Foley 2012, Catzim and Walker 2013, Barner 
2015, Valdés-pizzini et al. 2016, Mcdonald et al. 2017). 
Despite the promise of catch share programs, like TURFs, several challenges exist to 
their overall success. One such challenge is establishing international governance policies 
between countries that share a resource system, like in the Caribbean (Christie and White 2007, 
Matias et al. 2013). Another obstacle presents itself by way of “roving bandits,” which are 
fishing fleets that enter a fishery from outside the community and exploit the marine resources 
(Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009). Furthermore, ecological (i.e. commercial species density) 
and socioeconomic (i.e. fisher income) outcomes often take a long time (>10 years) to improve 
following TURF implementation (Villaseñor-Derbez et al. 2019), despite the desire for 
immediate improvements. However, it is important to evaluate how TURF programs impact the 
livelihoods and perceptions of the users to determine gaps in their effectiveness in the short- and 
long-term.  
TURFs have been implemented in small scale fisheries contexts worldwide through 
partnerships with diverse stakeholders at the academic, government, and non-government 
organization (NGO) levels. For example, benthic fisheries in Chile are currently managed by a 
TURF system, which is proving effective at increasing species richness and encouraging 
collective action among fishers (Gelcich et al. 2012a, 2012b, Gelcich 2014). In Baja California 
and along the Yucatan Peninsula in Mexico, several small TURF programs have emerged, which 
often pair with pre-existing fisher cooperatives and marine reserves (Basurto et al. 2013, Aceves-
Bueno et al. 2017, Villaseñor-Derbez et al. 2019). Many of these have not been in place long 
enough for social and ecological benefits to come to fruition. In the Caribbean, the first TURFs 
emerged in Belize in 2011, with two pilot sites established at the Glover’s Reef and Port 
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Honduras Marine Reserves, and seven additional sites added in 2016 (Foley 2012, Catzim and 
Walker 2013, Belize Fisheries Department 2015, Fujita et al. 2017, Karr et al. 2017, McDonald 
et al. 2017, Belize Fisheries Department 2019), but there has been no formal evaluation of the 
program since its inception.  
This study is the first to evaluate the community perceptions of Belize’s TURF program - 
known as Managed Access (MA). The purpose of this study was to evaluate the impact of MA 
participation on the knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) of fishers from southern Belize. 
KAP studies provide enhanced understanding of management effectiveness by asking 
respondents about their perceptions towards management rules, attributes, and policies at the 
individual and community level (Gupta et al. 2015, Heinen et al. 2016). For this study, fishers 
from 10 communities in Southern Belize were interviewed in 2014 by the Belize Fisheries 
Department (Belize Fisheries Department 2015) — two years before the national implementation 
of MA — and again by me in 2019. We compared the responses from fishers in 2014 to those in 
2019, and conducted 2019-specific analyses to understand fisher perceptions towards several 
program-related components (logbook process, enforcement, and support). Because fishers are 
key stakeholders of the Managed Access program, it is essential to understand what they know, 
understand and perceive about the program. This is because fisher buy-in is critical for the long-
term sustainability of fisheries management policies. From their perceptions, we can interpret if 
the MA program is meeting its objectives, which focus on increased fisher income, catch per unit 
effort, and decreased illegal fishing – all in line with fishers’ goals. Insights from this study can 






Belize is in Central America, and is home to the second longest barrier coral reef in the 
world – the Belize Barrier Reef (BBR) – which spans over 300 kilometers (Figure 4.1). Seven 
protected areas within the BBR have been a part of a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1996 
(UNESCO 2019). The Belize Barrier Reef is part of the larger Mesoamerican Barrier Reef 
System, which traces the coasts of Belize, Mexico, and Honduras. The reef system incorporates 
the diverse marine habitats of mangroves, seagrass beds, fringing and patch coral reefs, and 
several offshore atolls. Because of this rich biodiversity, ecotourism and fishing are two of the 
most prevalent livelihood strategies among Belizeans (Gopal et al. 2015).  
Lobster, conch, snapper and grouper are the primary fishery species across Belize 
(Catzim and Walker 2013). Lobster season goes from June 15 until February 14, while conch 
season is from October 1 - April 30. Lobster traps, shades, and free-diving are the primary 
methods fisherfolk target lobster and conch (Fujita et al. 2017). Finfish can be harvested 
anytime, and there are currently no quotas on finfish species except parrotfish, Nassau grouper, 
tarpon, bonefish and permit, which are prohibited from extraction. However, special licenses are 
granted for fishers to target lane snapper spawning aggregations (Belize Fisheries Department 
2019). Nearshore finfish are harvested by handlines, spear guns and traps (Fujita et al. 2017). 
The fishing industry is male-dominated (~95% male), although they find women approachable 
and many fisheries managers/NGO leaders are women (Catzim and Walker 2013). 
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Coastal resource management structure and history 
In the early 1980s, the first marine protected areas (MPAs) were established in Belize, 
restricting fishing from distinct offshore locations and demonstrating a commitment to marine 
resource sustainability by the government (Alves, in review). During that time, fishers were not 
regularly included in marine resource management decisions, until 2009, when Belize began 
reforming fisheries practices. In 2011, Belize became the first country in the Caribbean to 
implement Managed Access (MA) – a Territorial User Rights for Fishing (TURF) regime that 
grants fishers rights to fish in select areas in exchange for reporting their catch and color-coding 
their vessel(s) (Foley 2012, Belize Fisheries Department 2015, Barner 2015, Fujita et al. 2017, 
McDonald et al. 2017, Belize Fisheries Department 2019). The MA program was the result of 
over a decade of planning between the Belize government, the Environmental Defense Fund 
(EDF), and Belizean non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Foley 2012, Catzim and Walker 
2013, Belize Fisheries Department 2015, Fujita et al. 2017, McDonald et al. 2017, Belize 
Fisheries Department 2019). Many NGOs act as co-managers of the marine reserves (and fishing 
areas) with the Belize Fisheries Department to enforce MA rules, issue logbooks, and provide 
resources to fishers. Two pilot MA sites were established in 2011, one of which paired with the 
Port Honduras Marine Reserve (PHMR, established in 2000), while the other was incorporated 
into the Glover’s Reef Marine Reserve (GHMR, established 1998). In a 2013 assessment of the 
pilot sites by Catzim and Walker (2013), illegal fishing had decreased and reported catches had 
increased among fishers in the pilot sites.  
This encouraged the Belize government and partner NGOs to begin a nationwide 
campaign in 2014 to educate fishers and the public about the proposed national expansion of 
MA. Paired with this educational campaign was a survey across Belizean coastal fishing 
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communities to measure the knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) of respondents towards 
the proposed national expansion of MA (Belize Fisheries Department 2015). The 2014 KAP 
survey was coordinated by the Marine Conservation and Climate Adaptation Project (MCCAP) 
within the Belize Fisheries Department (Belize Fisheries Department 2015). Then, in 2016, the 
Managed Access program was implemented nationwide across Belize, adding six fishing areas to 
the pre-existing two pilot sites.  
This study is the first to explore the impact of program participation on the knowledge, 
attitudes, and practices of fishers in Belize. Due to funding and logistical constraints, this project 
was a case study that targeted users of four MA areas (3, 4, 5 8), representing 10 communities in 
southern Belize (Figure 4.1). The 2019 sampling methodology, survey design and data collection 
were based off of the 2014 survey methodology.  
 
Sampling design and methodology 
The target population for both the 2014 and 2019 surveys were licensed commercial 
fishers who were over 18 years old. Respondents for the 2014 survey were selected through a 
stratified random sampling methodology based off of a list of all licensed commercial fishers 
from the Belize Fisheries Department (Belize Fisheries Department 2015 and 2019). Because of 
logistical constraints, the 2019 survey targeted fishers only in Southern Belize. We used a 
stratified random sampling methodology to select fishers from the following southern 
communities: Dangriga, Hopkins, Riversdale, Seine Bight, Placencia, Independence, Monkey 
River, Punta Negra, Punta Gorda, and Barranco. For the sake of comparison, Forest Home, 
Cattle Landing and Punta Gorda surveys were combined in 2014 to be compared to Punta Gorda 
surveys in 2019. The three communities are adjacent to one another and the town center is Punta 
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Gorda. Table 4.1 expresses the number of respondents and percent of the population surveyed in 
each community and year.  
To identify and recruit participants for the 2019 survey, we accessed a list of fisher’s 
names, telephone numbers and addresses from local NGO partners (the Toledo Institute for 
Development and Environment, TIDE and the Southern Environmental Association, SEA). The 
difference in fishers surveyed in each community is due to variance in number of licensed fishers 
per community (i.e. lower numbers reflect communities with fewer fishers) and difficulty in 
fisher recruitment across communities (i.e. fishers in some communities were easier to recruit 
than others). Within those communities, we visited neighborhoods and villages, and some 
fishers’ homes. 
To decrease the likelihood of bias in both 2014 and 2019, a variety of recruitment 
methods were used in the different communities. Snowball sampling was employed where 
identified key informants and previous participants led us to other respondents (Coleman 1959, 
Goodman 1961). Respondent-driven convenience sampling was also used, where participants 
were selected based on the level of access (time, place, and willingness to participate) 
(Heckathorn 1997). We held scheduled and random household visits, called fishers on the 
telephone to set up household visits, intercepted fishers while at fish markets, and scheduled 
meetings at community centers with a small refreshment. To recruit fishers to participate in the 
community meetings, we reached out to fishers who were leaders in their communities (e.g. head 
of fisher associations) and asked that they help us advertise to the fishers in their communities. 
We also distributed flyers to public places that included a brief statement of informed consent; 
the date, time and location of the community meetings; the name and contact information of the 
primary author, and a statement requiring proof of valid commercial fishing license. We 
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understand that there still might be some selection bias as we used key informants of some 
communities to help us organize meetings with fishers; also, those who consented to survey 
might be more/less supportive of MA, and may have less survey fatigue than those who declined. 
 
Designing and pre-testing the survey questionnaire 
To thoroughly investigate the knowledge, attitudes, perceptions and behaviors of fishers, 
both the 2014 and 2019 surveys were designed using the peer-reviewed literature focusing on 
measuring livelihoods and environmental dependence and the knowledge, attitudes, and practices 
of common-pool resource users towards management decisions (Appendix B). We also drew 
upon consultations with key agency and community informants. Because the purpose of this 
study was to examine the impact of MA program participation on the knowledge, attitudes, and 
practices of fishers from 2014-2019, the 2019 survey was modified from the 2014 KAP survey 
(Belize Fisheries Department 2015). This provides a basis for comparison among key responses, 
however several differences exist between the 2014 survey and the one we implemented. For 
instance, the 2019 survey included demographic questions at the end of the survey to eliminate 
survey fatigue at the more important livelihood and perceptions questions. The 2019 survey 
included MA-specific questions from the 2014 survey as well as more MA-program questions 
involving fishing methods, the typical catch in a fishing trip, perceptions about enforcement, 
insights into accurate logbook reporting, and use of alternative livelihood strategies. The 2019 
survey was also shortened to ensure it could be easily completed within 20-30 minutes, and 
therefore reduce respondent fatigue. 
Respondents were asked a series of questions related to their fishing behavior, 
knowledge, and attitudes towards the MA program and demographic information (Tables 4.2-
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4.4). To measure knowledge, attitudes, and practices towards the MA program components, 
respondents were asked to rank their responses using either Yes/No/Not Sure or by using a 5-
point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3= Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 
5= Strongly agree). Non-responses were removed from the sample while those who did not 
know/did not have an opinion were reported separately from the sample. Additional questions 
were asked of respondents in 2019 to examine the perceptions of fishers towards Managed 
Access program-specific components (Table 4.4). Such responses were broken into the following 
categories: (A) enforcement and rule following, (B) logbook reporting, (C) support for the MA 
program in general. Prior to survey implementation, the survey instrument was pre-tested with 
enumerators and managers at the partner NGOs. Language clarity improved, additional marine 
species caught were added, and a list of alternative livelihood strategies was updated. Pre-testing 
was an important component of the survey planning process because it ensured the questionnaire 
was clear and not too long.  
 
Enumerator hiring and training 
For both survey years, individuals experienced in marine resource management were 
hired and trained as enumerators to conduct the interviews. In 2014 they were recruited from 
local NGOs and from the Belize Fisheries Department staff (Belize Fisheries Department 2015). 
In 2019, enumerators were recruited from the group of community researchers at TIDE and SEA, 
due to their in-depth knowledge of the communities served by the two organizations. Enumerator 
training occurred prior to survey implementation and during the course of one week. Training 
included presentations on the purpose of the research study, the proposed methods and fieldwork 
schedule, instructions on how to use the Open Data Kit (ODK) software (Hartung et al., 2010), 
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tablets, and associated passwords (for 2019), practice interviewing and being interviewed, and 
familiarity with the survey instrument. Enumerator training also covered best practices for 
conducting social science interviews, which emphasized the importance of confidentiality and 
anonymity with fishers, reading a statement of informed consent at the beginning of each survey, 
translating the survey to local languages on spot from English, and how to handle difficult 
situations (respondent refuses to answer question, gets confused or angry, etc.). 
 
Data collection 
In 2014, survey implementation occurred in May, while in 2019 it occurred in May and 
the first half of June. In 2014, 60 close-ended questions were asked of respondents using paper 
surveys (Belize Fisheries Department 2015). In 2019, 50 close-ended questions were asked of 
respondents on tablets using the Open Data Kit software and associated open-source resources 
on Android tablets (Hartung et al. 2010). When respondents were particularly interested in the 
research subject, we encouraged them to provide additional information in a semi-structured 
interview format. Often these key informants were fishers who were leaders in their 
communities, representing their fisher organizations and coastal communities. In 2019, semi-
structured interviews with key informants (n = 20) occurred in these communities: Punta Gorda, 
Monkey River, Punta Negra, Hopkins, Seine Bight, Riversdale, and Dangriga. In 2019, the 
primary author also was a participant observer of the fisheries management process at a Fisher 
Forum representing MA areas 4 and 5 in Punta Gorda, on June 6. To assist with contextualizing 
the results of this study, the primary author regularly visited the local fish markets, docksides, 
produce markets, participated in town and village social events, and contributed to the local 
economies (e.g. patronage at restaurants, grocery stores, house rentals, and taxis).  
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Data entry, quality assurance, quality checking and analysis 
At the end of each day of data collection for both survey years, the team meetings were 
held between project members to follow-up, input and backup data into spreadsheets on a secure 
computer drive. The primary author manually inspected each survey for quality assurance, 
quality checking and completion. To report the summary of the population sampled, we first 
calculated the number and percentage of respondents fitting seven demographic variables (Table 
4.2: gender, age range, highest level of education, number of additional persons in household, 
cultural group, membership to fisheries organization(s), and percent daily catch kept for family).  
To compare the knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions of fishers towards the Managed 
Access program rules and potential components between 2014 and 2019, and between 
respondents from 2019, we used the Likert package in R (Bryer and Speerschneider 2016). We 
divided up responses for comparison based on if they were Yes/No/Not Sure and then those that 
were asked on a 5-point Likert scale (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). To determine if statistically significant 
differences in response existed between 2014 and 2019 for the Yes/No/Not Sure questions, we 
conducted a Chi (χ)-square test on the count (number of responses) for each response type and 
year. Non-responses expressed as NA’s and refusals to answer were dropped from the analysis. 
The R studio software version 3.6. was used to visualize and quantify trends among the data and 
variables of interest (R Core Team 2020). The code is available upon request to the 
corresponding author. The semi-structured interviews with key informants from 2019 (n = 20) 
were coded by hand, with specific themes identified and direct quotes identified in the results’ 




Demographic profile of respondents from 2014 and 2019 
 A total of 362 respondents were interviewed in 2014 while 123 were interviewed in 2019 
(Table 4.2). In 2014, 6.35% of respondents were female, while the other 93.65% were male. The 
population surveyed in 2019 was very similar, with 5.69% of respondents reporting as female 
and 94.31% as male (Table 4.2). In 2014, the majority of respondents were between 21-50 years 
old, with the most respondents (26.80%) in the 31-40-year-old age range. On the other hand, in 
2019, the majority (31.71%) of respondents were in the 41-50-year-old range (Table 4.2). For 
both survey years, most respondents’ highest level of education was primary school, with 
46.96% of respondents in 2014 and 53.66% of respondents from 2019. The next highest level of 
education completed by respondents of both years was secondary school/high school level 
(32.04% in 2014 and 33.33% in 2019, Table 4.2).  
The surveyed populations of both years were also similar for the number of additional 
persons living in their household, with the most respondents of both years (~30%) sharing their 
household with more than five individuals (Table 4.2). The highest proportion of respondents 
from 2014 (41.44%) belonged to the Creole cultural group, with the next highest proportions 
representing Garifuna (29.01%) and Mestizo (15.47%). This breakdown is also reflected in the 
population from 2019 (Table 4.2). 41.71% of respondents in 2014 reported belonging to a fishing 
cooperative, while only 22.76% of respondents in 2019 were cooperative members (Table 4.2). 
The majority of respondents in both years reported keeping less than half of their daily catch for 
their families (71.55% in 2014 and 80.49% in 2019).  
 
92  
Comparison of the knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions of fishers towards MA rules and 
program components, between 2014 and 2019 
 
Fishers’ perceptions toward the Managed Access program rules and components varied 
between 2014 and 2019 (Table 4.3, Figures 4.2 and 4.3). The survey questionnaires gauged 
fishers’ perceptions towards the eligibility rules for getting and renewing a Managed Access 
license as well as the rights-based and reporting components of the program (Table 4.3, Figures 
4.2 and 4.3). There were statistically significant differences in the percentage of respondents who 
answered “Yes” versus “No” versus “Not sure” between 2014 (n = 362) and 2019 (n = 123) for 
the prompt “Fishers are required to record their catch” (χ2 = 36.97, df = 3, p < 0.001), with more 
respondents answering “Yes” in 2019 than 2014 (Table 4.3, Figure 4.2). There were not 
statistically significant differences in the responses to “I know the requirements to obtain a 
Managed Access license” between 2014 (n = 234) and 2019 (n = 123, χ2 = 2.80, df = 3, p = 
0.423). In 2014, 65.81% of respondents answered “Yes”, while in 2019 71.54% answered “Yes” 
(Table 4.3, Figure 4.2).  
Similarly, for the prompt “I know the terms for Managed Access license renewal,” there 
were not statistically significant differences in the responses between 2014 (n = 235) and 2019 (n 
= 123, χ2 = 7.44, df = 3, p = 0.059). Most respondents in 2014 (56.60%) and 2019 (69.91%) 
responded “Yes” to the prompt (Table 3, Figure 2). However, there were statistically significant 
differences in the responses to the prompt “There are benefits to having Managed Access rights” 
between respondents in 2014 (n = 360) and those in 2019 (n = 123, χ2 = 11.84, df = 3, p = 0.00). 
Significantly more respondents (56.91%) answered “Yes” to that prompt in 2019 than in 2014 
(41.94%, Table 4.3, Figure 4.2). Lastly, to the prompt “There are benefits to reporting catch,” 
there were no statistically significant differences in responses between respondents in 2014 (n = 
361) and 2019 (n = 123, χ2 = 6.17, df = 3, p = 0.104). Most respondents in 2014 (52.53%) and 
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2019 (43.09%) said “Yes” to the prompt, while the proportion of respondents who answered 
“No” and “Not Sure” were more similarly distributed (Table 4.3, Figure 4.2).  
Fishers’ perceptions towards the Managed Access program as measured on a 5-point 
Likert scale also differed between the two sampling years (Table 4.3, Figure 4.3). Most of the 
respondents in 2014 (71%) and 2019 (75%) agreed or strongly agreed with the prompt, “Fishers 
in my community can locate boundaries of marine reserves” (Table 4.3, Figure 4.3). In 2019, a 
higher proportion of respondents (55%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “MA rights 
have been fairly distributed to fishers,” compared to 39% in 2014 (Table 4.3, Figure 4.3). 
However, in 2014, 50% of respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with that statement 
(Table 4.3, Figure 4.3). Lastly, in response to the statement, “Most fishers in my community can 
be trusted,” most respondents from both 2014 (67%) and 2019 (75%) agreed or strongly agreed 
(Table 4.3, Figure 4.3). 
 
Managed Access program-specific analyses (from 2019) 
Survey Questionnaires 
Respondents in 2019 (n = 81) were asked to state the level to which they agreed with 
several statements to gauge their perceptions towards several Managed Access program-specific 
components, separated into the following three categories: (A) enforcement and rule following, 
(B) logbook reporting, (C) support for the MA program in general (Table 4.4, Figure 4.4). In the 
enforcement and rule following category, the majority of respondents either agreed (61.73%) or 
strongly agreed (24.69%) with the statement, “Most fishers in my community follow the rules,” 
but 72% of respondents reported agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement, “I have seen 
fishers fishing without a license” (Table 4.4, Figure 4.4). However, there is wide agreement by 
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84% of respondents that “Fishers in my community can manage our fishery” (Table 4.4, Figure 
4.4). When asked if fishers “Trust the enforcement of MA,” 44.44% agree with the statement, 
while 13.58% strongly disagree and 25.93% disagree with the statement (Table 4.4, Figure 4.4). 
There was almost an even split between respondents who agree (49%) and disagree (47%) that 
“Illegal fishing in marine reserves has declined” (Table 4.4, Figure 4.4). Lastly, 49% of 
respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “Enforcement has improved 
under MA” (Table 4.4, Figure 4.4). 
In the logbook reporting category, 77% of respondents agreed (59.26%) or strongly 
agreed (17.28%) with the prompt, “Logbooks are easy to fill out” (Table 4.4, Figure 4.4). Similar 
viewpoints were expressed by respondents to the prompt, “I fill out my logbook accurately,” 
with 49.38% of respondents stating they agree with it, and 22.22% strongly agreeing (Table 4.4, 
Figure 4.4). In the category for support for the MA program in general, 68% of respondents 
agreed (49.38%) or strongly agreed (18.52%) with the statement, “I fully support MA in the long 
run” (Table 4.4, Figure 4.4). A similarly high proportion of respondents (67%) also agreed that 
“MA is improving the marine resources” (Table 4.4, Figure 4.4). When asked if “MA is 
benefiting my livelihood,” 56% of respondents agree (46.91%) or strongly agree (8.64%) while 
32% disagree (18.52%) or strongly disagree (13.58%) with the statement (Table 4.4, Figure 4.4). 
Most (48%) respondents either disagree (39.51%) or strongly disagree (8.64%) with the 
statement “I spend less time fishing now,” while 41% of respondents agree (38.27%) or strongly 
agree (2.47%) with it (Table 4.4, Figure 4.4). Lastly, 47% of respondents either disagree 
(32.10%) or strongly disagree (14.81%) with the statement “My catch has improved under MA” 
while 40% agree (33.33%) or strongly agree (6.17%) with it (Table 4.4, Figure 4.4). 
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Themes from Semi-Structured Interviews 
The themes that arose from the semi-structured interviews with key informants in 2019 (n 
= 20) were broken into the three categories from the 2019 quantitative surveys (enforcement and 
rule following, logbook reporting, and support for the MA program), as well as two additional 
categories: the importance of fishing to respondents’ livelihoods and well-being, and the active 
role fishers can play in the MA process. One of the most common themes that arose was the need 
for increased enforcement. One fisher said, “I have no problem breaking the rules because 
Fisheries [Department] isn’t doing their job,” while another said, “Why make more rules if 
nobody is enforcing anything?”  
Another common theme with fishers was their criticism of the role of local NGOs in the 
enforcement of MA. One expressed that the local NGO co-manager of their fishing area is 
“Managing, but not for us, but for them,” while another said “Our ideas aren’t good because 
they go against their show.” One respondent stated that “[Local NGO] only helps fishermen with 
mouth,” not with action. Another fisher said, “For who is [Local NGO] protecting this area? Not 
for the Belizeans, it’s for the aliens,” demonstrating a concern with illegal, transboundary fishers 
also using their MA area. Several other fishers noted that some of the NGO rangers who patrol 
the MA areas won’t report illegal fishing if they know the fishers or if they get paid off, 
highlighting a gap in enforcement effectiveness.  
Statements about the inaccuracy of the logbook data were prevalent in the interviews. 
One fisher stated that the logbook reporting “Is just a waste of a fisherman’s time…They’re [co-
managers and the Fisheries Department] not getting the true information.” Another fisher from 
a different community stated that logbooks, “To me, they’re a waste of time.” One even said, 
“None of the data are legitimate data; they’re bulls***.” At least one fisher admitted to the 
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corresponding author, “To be honest with you, I didn’t fill out one logbook.” One respondent 
recognized that the inaccuracy of the data cannot be used for any management decisions, stating 
that managers “Can’t use the data ’cause it’s not right.” 
Respondents were also critical about the effectiveness of the Managed Access program. 
One fisher who had been fishing for over 40 years said, “I thought the words would speak for 
themselves -- Managed Access -- but it has to be managed.” Others echoed similar sentiments, 
with one respondent stating, “This Managed Access thing isn’t working” and another: “I can’t 
say it’s positively benefitting us.” One respondent even said, “If I could fish what I was getting 
before I’d say Managed Access is working.” Another fisher expressed additional concerns about 
if the program is meeting management goals, stating, “Managed Access is not working how they 
wanted it to.” Lastly, a fisher stated that they felt they “have no rights” as members of Managed 
Access. 
Another theme that arose in the semi-structured interviews was the importance of fishing 
to respondents’ livelihoods and well-beings. Three separate individuals expressed that fishing 
and being at sea is their lifeblood. One stated, “If I don’t go to sea, I’m gonna die,” while another 
said, “[If] I can’t make a living fishing – I’d die.” The third individual stated, “The sea is a part 
of me,” demonstrating how intertwined their identity is with fishing. Several respondents also 
expressed that they no longer fish as much as they used to, having turned to tourism or other 
alternative livelihood strategies to make ends meet. One fisher who now is a tour guide part-time 
said, “When I am not fishing, I am helping the ocean,” recognizing that they can make a living 
preserving marine life instead of extracting it. Another individual told us, “I take my kids out 
every two weeks to show them what I used to do,” carrying on the fishing tradition to younger 
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generations but not needing it for their livelihood. The same fisher also called marine life 
“Belize’s heartbeat.” 
The final theme prevalent throughout the key informant interviews was about the active 
role fishers can play in the MA process. One fisher stated in Creole, “Make we protect dis ting 
for we self,” demonstrating their willingness to be involved in the monitoring and self-reporting 
aspect of Managed Access. Another fisher reflected on the changes in management, stating, “If it 
were still up to us, I think we’d still have a good healthy reef.” One fisher recognized the 
importance of protecting marine resources for future generations when they said, “We want to 
protect our stuff for our ancestors.” Another expressed interest in learning more about the 
logbook data collection and analysis process: “What if you educate me more.”  
Overall, the semi-structured interviews revealed that fishers are concerned about the 
effectiveness of Managed Access and the accuracy of the logbook data, but are willing to get 
more involved in the participatory monitoring process of the program. Their criticism of the 
NGO co-managers in the enforcement of Managed Access demonstrates room for improvement 
for the program moving forward.  
 
Discussion 
Summary of key findings 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions of 
fishers from southern Belize towards the newly implemented TURF program known as Managed 
Access (MA). We compared the responses from fishers in 2014 – two years before the national 
implementation of MA – to those from 2019 and found that the surveyed populations shared 
some demographic characteristics. About 94% of both populations were male, the majority of 
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respondents’ highest level of education completed was primary school, most shared their 
household with more than five individuals, and most respondents were either in the Creole or 
Garifuna cultural groups. However, more respondents in 2014 were members of a fishing 
cooperative than those in 2019. The similar demographic information between the two sampled 
populations suggests similarities in the overall population characteristics, providing a basis for 
comparison of their knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of the MA program between the two 
years.  
Overall, fishers from both years understood the requirements for acquiring and renewing 
their licenses, but in 2019, more fishers understood the requirement of logbook reporting and the 
benefits of having MA rights than those in 2014. These changes demonstrate that the increased 
education and outreach efforts of the co-managers that occurred throughout the MA 
implementation process (Belize Fisheries Department 2015 and 2019) could have potentially led 
to this shift in responses (D’agata et al. 2020). However, fishers in both 2014 and 2019 answered 
similarly to the prompt, “There are benefits to reporting catch,” showcasing that even after three 
years of MA implementation, fishers’ perception towards the logbook reporting process did not 
change. The semi-structured interviews with key informants supported these claims, with several 
respondents expressing that the data reported in logbooks are not accurate and are a waste of 
time to report. This dissatisfaction with the accuracy and benefit of the logbook reporting process 
highlights a potential avenue of focus for future educational outreach efforts, even if most (77%) 
respondents in 2019 agreed that logbooks are easy to fill out and that they (72%) fill out their 
logbook accurately.  
67 – 75% of respondents surveyed in 2014 and 2019 agreed that their communities can 
locate boundaries of marine reserves and be trusted, demonstrating the potential for long-term 
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collective action and involvement in fisheries management (Armitage et al. 2012, Basurto et al. 
2013, Aceves-Bueno et al. 2017, Karr et al. 2017, Alexander et al. 2018). This sentiment of 
confidence in one’s fishing community was mirrored in several responses only asked of fishers 
in 2019, with 86% of respondents agreeing that fishers in their community follow the rules, and 
84% of respondents agreeing that fishers in their community can manage our fishery. This 
suggests further potential for fisher empowerment in the participatory process of Managed 
Access, and certain room for improvement going forward. Involving fishers in the data-
collection and reporting process is not a new concept to participatory fisheries management, but 
is one that requires institutional capacity, resources and fisher buy-in in the long run (Wiber et al. 
2004, Lundquist and Granek 2005). In Belize, fishers are not involved in the management 
decisions or data-collection process as much as the program set out to achieve (Karr et al. 2017, 
Fujita et al. 2018), demonstrating a gap in the overall efficacy of Managed Access. 
However, one of the biggest issues that arose in the 2019 was about non-licensed fishers 
and a lack of enforcement, with the finding that 72% of respondents reported seeing “fishers 
fishing without a license,” 47% disagreeing with the statement that “Illegal fishing in marine 
reserves has declined,” and 49% of respondents disagreeing that “Enforcement has improved 
under Managed Access.” For those respondents who stated they have seen fishers fishing in 
areas without a license, this could be indicative of on-going conflicts of transboundary, non-
licensed fishers fishing in Belize’s territorial waters (source: key informant interviews). Similar 
sentiments were revealed through the semi-structured key informant interviews, with two 
respondents separately criticizing the enforcement measures by the Fisheries department, stating: 
“I have no problem breaking the rules because Fisheries [Department] isn’t doing their job,” 
and, “Why make more rules if nobody is enforcing anything?” These responses indicate that 
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enforcing the rules of MA is still an obstacle to the perceived success and legal adoption of the 
program. These findings are concordant with a recent study by Wade et a. (2019), which found 
that fishers negatively perceived the enforcement and illegal fishing activities, demonstrating an 
area of improvement for policymakers.  
 
Belize context 
As of late 2019, a new Fisheries Resource Bill was passed, which includes policies 
geared towards increased participation by diverse stakeholder groups and improved enforcement 
and monitoring guidelines (Belize Fisheries Department 2019). It is possible that the 
implementation of this new bill will resolve some of the present criticisms of the Managed 
Access program by fishers found in this study. Furthermore, Belize is a place where pre-existing 
governance structures exist to empower fisherfolk, encourage participatory co-management 
across stakeholder groups and adapt to new data-driven indicators of fisheries management 
effectiveness (Fujita et al. 2017, Karr et al. 2017, McDonald et al. 2017). However, fisher 
perceptions revealed criticism of the enforcement strategies of managers and a willingness to get 
more involved, suggesting room for improvement of the program in the long-run. This study 
demonstrates the importance of including fisher perceptions in the evaluation of fisheries 
policies, as their buy-in ensures long-term sustainability (Wiber et al. 2004, Cudney-Bueno and 
Basurto 2009). 
 
Study limitations and suggested next steps 
This was the first study to evaluate the knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions of fishers 
towards the implementation of the Managed Access program in Belize. However, due to 
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logistical and financial constraints, we focused on a small scale, only interviewing fishers from 
10 communities in southern Belize. Because of this, we are missing out on the feedback of 
northern fishers, who have different fishing strategies, and potentially cultural and behavioral 
differences as well, especially in regards to historic fishing practices and varied relationships 
with the co-manager NGOs (Perez 2009, key informant interviews). Therefore, the conclusions 
made in this study about fishers’ knowledge, attitudes and practices related to MA is spatially 
constrained to the communities where we interviewed. Furthermore, the follow-up study in 2019 
was conducted only three years after nationwide implementation of MA, which was likely not 
long enough to see the impact of the public policy change on the perceptions of users. Ecological 
and socioeconomic outcomes often take over 10 years to improve following TURF 
implementation (Villaseñor-Derbez et al. 2019) despite the desire for immediate improvements.  
Due to the limited scope of this study, there are additional questions that could be asked 
of the data collected to further understand the intricacies of fisher perceptions towards the MA 
program. I am particularly interested in examining if differences in perceptions exist between 
fishers who are members of fisher associations or cooperatives, compared to those who do not 
belong to any organization. This would assist in answering questions about the role of fisher 
organizations in inspiring collective action and influencing the perceptions of the membership 
(Wiber et al. 2004, Partelow et al. 2020). Furthermore, additional analyzes should investigate the 
potential impact of socio-economic variables on fisher perceptions. Such variables could include 
percent income from fishing, alternative livelihood strategies, and/or assets owned by fishers, 
which were all obtained in the 2019 survey (Appendix B). These suggested analyzes contribute 
to enhanced interpretation of why including fisher perceptions is important to understanding the 
MA program on a whole. 
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 Our conclusions are primarily based off of quantitative surveys, so we encourage future 
studies to be conducted across Belize and include more qualitative data collection methods such 
as in-depth focus groups, key informant interviews, and even experimental games. Additional 
studies should focus on the potential for continued collective action and monitoring of the MA 
areas by the fishers as way to fill in the gap in enforcement capacity by co-manager NGOs and 
the Fisheries Department that currently exists and was perceived by fishers in 2019. This would 
gather more information about the gaps in participatory management that currently exist in the 
MA program. 
 
Recommendations for managers 
We recommend natural resource managers conduct user surveys before and after public 
policy interventions like MA, spacing the interviews at least 10 years apart (Villaseñor-Derbez et 
al. 2019). However, even doing a post-implementation a post-implementation assessment like 
ours within five years can glean several important components to the overall efficacy of policy 
interventions. This study also demonstrates the importance of prioritizing effective enforcement 
activities by not only the Fisheries Officers at the co-manager NGOs and Fisheries Department, 
who are currently the primary ones responsible for enforcement, but also fishers. There is the 
potential for fishers to increase participation in collective action by monitoring/self-policing their 
areas (cite). Increasing the trainings and reporting responsibilities for fishers would also lead to 
much-needed support for pre-existing gaps in management capacity (Gill et al. 2017). This 
project would not have been possible without the willingness of natural resource managers in 
Belize to partner with us, demonstrating the importance of inter-institutional collaborations and 
the value placed on using science to inform policy decisions in Belize.  
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Figure 4. 1: Site map of 10 communities surveyed across southern Belize in both 2014 and 2019.  
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# obs. 2014 (%) 
n = 362 
# obs. 2019 (%) 
n = 123 
Barranco 0 (0.00) 3 (2.44) 
Cattle Landing 1 (0.28) 0 (0.00) 
Dangriga Town 108 (29.83) 16 (13.01) 
Forest Home 2 (0.55) 0 (0.00) 
Hopkins 37 (10.22) 17 (13.82) 
Independence 57 (15.75) 10 (8.13) 
Monkey River 12 (3.31) 15 (12.20) 
Placencia 52 (14.36) 15 (12.20) 
Punta Gorda 72 (19.89) 28 (22.76) 
Punta Negra 5 (1.38) 7 (5.69) 
Riversdale 8 (2.21)  7 (5.69) 




Table 4. 2: Demographic summary statistics of fisherfolk surveys conducted in 2014 (n = 362) 
and 2019 (n = 123). 
 
Variable Description of Responses 
# obs. 2014 (%) 
n = 362 
# obs. 2019 (%) 
n = 123 
Gender Female 23 (6.35) 7 (5.69) 
 Male 339 (93.65) 116 (94.31) 
        
Age Range (years) 18 to 20 16 (4.42) 2 (1.63) 
 21 to 30 89 (24.59) 23 (18.70) 
 31 to 40 97 (26.80) 20 (16.26) 
 41 to 50 79 (21.82) 39 (31.71) 
 51 to 60 51 (12.09) 22 (17.89) 
 61 or older 30 (8.29) 17 (13.82) 
        
Highest Level of 
Education No school completed 37 (10.22) 8 (6.50) 
 Primary school level 170 (46.96) 66 (53.66) 
 
Secondary school/high 
school level 116 (32.04) 41 (33.33) 
 
Tertiary school/post-high 
school level 28 (7.73) 7 (5.69) 
 Trade/Vocational course 9 (2.49) 1 (0.81) 
 Other 2 (0.55) 0 (0.00) 




Household Zero 3 (0.83) 7 (5.69) 
 One 35 (9.67) 11 (8.94) 
 Two 33 (9.12) 11 (8.94) 
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 Three 47 (12.98) 14 (11.38) 
 Four 61 (16.85) 21 (17.07) 
 Five 69 (19.06) 22 (17.89) 
 More than Five 112 (30.94) 37 (30.08) 
 No Response 2 (0.55) 0 (0.00) 
        
Cultural Group Creole 150 (41.44) 42 (34.15) 
 East Indian 27 (7.46) 9 (7.32) 
 Garifuna 105 (29.01) 36 (29.27) 
 Maya 4 (1.10) 3 (2.44) 
 Mestizo 56 (15.47) 26 (21.14) 
 Other 20 (5.52) 7 (5.69) 
        
Membership to 
Fisheries 
Organization(s) Cooperative 151 (41.71) 28 (22.76) 
 
Belize Fisherman 
Cooperative Association 18 (4.97) 5 (4.07) 
 Fisheries Association 61 (16.85) 2 (1.63) 
 None 131 (36.19) 37 (30.08) 
 Other 0 (0.00) 51 (41.46) 
 No Response 1 (0.28) 0 (0.00) 
        
Percent Daily 
Catch Kept for 
Family None 19 (5.25) 9 (7.32) 
 Less than Half 259 (71.55) 99 (80.49) 
 Half 24 (6.63) 8 (6.50) 
 More than Half 22 (6.08) 1 (0.81) 
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 All 17 (4.70) 0 (0.00) 
 Other 1 (0.28) 6 (4.88) 
 Don't Know 16 (4.42) 0 (0.00) 




Table 4. 3: Reported responses to gauge fishers’ knowledge, attitudes and practices related to the 
Managed Access program in both 2014 and 2019. Sample size varied by question type, as there 
was some non-response for certain questions. 
 
Variable Description of Responses 
# obs. 2014 (%) 
n = 362 
# obs. 2019 (%) 
n = 123 
Fishers are required to 
report their catch Yes 199 (54.97) 104 (84.55) 
 No 108 (29.83) 11 (8.94) 
 Not sure 55 (15.19) 8 (6.50) 
    
# obs. 2014 (%) 
n = 234 
# obs. 2019 (%) 
n = 123 
I know the 
requirements to obtain 
a MA license Yes 154 (65.81) 88 (71.54) 
 No 44 (18.80) 21 (17.07) 
 Not sure 36 (15.38) 14 (11.38) 
    
# obs. 2014 (%) 
n = 235 
# obs. 2019 (%) 
n = 123 
I know the terms for 
MA license renewal Yes 133 (56.60) 86 (69.91) 
 No 74 (31.50) 26 (21.14) 
 Not sure 28 (11.91) 11 (8.94) 
    
# obs. 2014 (%) 
n = 360 
# obs. 2019 (%) 
n = 123 
There are benefits to 
having MA rights Yes 151 (41.94) 70 (56.91) 
 No 109 (30.28) 32 (26.02) 
 Not sure 100 (27.78) 21 (17.07) 
    
# obs. 2014 (%) 
n = 361 
# obs. 2019 (%) 
n = 123 
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There are benefits to 
reporting catch Yes 189 (52.35) 53 (43.09) 
 No 96 (26.59) 42 (34.15) 
 Not sure 76 (21.05) 28 (22.76) 
    
# obs. 2014 (%) 
n = 202 
# obs. 2019 (%) 
n = 91 
Fishers in my 
community can locate 
boundaries of marine 
reserves Strongly disagree 4 (1.98) 5 (5.49) 
 Disagree 43 (21.29) 18 (19.78) 
 Neither agree nor disagree 12 (5.94) 0 (0.00) 
 Agree 107 (52.97) 50 (54.95) 
 Strongly agree 36 (17.82) 18 (19.78) 
    
# obs. 2014 (%) 
n = 202 
# obs. 2019 (%) 
n = 91 
MA rights have been 
fairly distributed to 
fishers Strongly disagree 28 (13.86) 20 (21.98) 
 Disagree 73 (36.14) 21 (23.08) 
 Neither agree nor disagree 22 (10.89) 0 (0.00) 
 Agree 67 (33.17) 42 (46.15) 
 Strongly agree 12 (5.94) 8 (8.79) 
    
# obs. 2014 (%) 
n = 202 
# obs. 2019 (%) 
n = 91 
Most fishers in my 
community can be 
trusted Strongly disagree 0 (0.00) 5 (5.49) 
 Disagree 67 (33.17) 18 (19.78) 
 Neither agree nor disagree 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
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 Agree 101 (50.00) 50 (54.95) 






Figure 4. 2: Comparison of fishers’ knowledge, attitudes, and practices towards the Managed 
Access rules and program components between 2014 and 2019, as measured with Yes/No/Not 




Figure 4. 3: Comparison of fishers’ perceptions towards the Managed Access program between 
2014 (n = 202) and 2019 (n = 91), as measured on a 5-point Likert scale. 
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Table 4. 4: Reported responses from 2019 respondents (n = 81) to examine fishers’ perceptions 
towards MA program-specific components on a 5-point Likert scale. Responses were broken into 
three categories: (A) enforcement and rule following, (B) logbook reporting, (C) support for the 











Neither  Agree  Strongly 
agree  
 Enforcement and Rule Following (n = 81) 
Most fishers in 
my community 
follow the rules 
3 (3.70) 4 (4.94) 4 (4.94) 50 (61.73) 20 (24.69) 




4 (4.94) 6 (7.41) 3 (3.70) 46 (56.79) 22 (27.16) 
I have seen 
fishers fishing 
without a license 
3 (3.70) 17 (20.99) 3 (3.70) 41 (50.62) 17 (20.99) 
I trust the 
enforcement of 
MA 
11 (13.58) 21 (25.93) 5 (6.17) 36 (44.44) 8 (9.88) 








17 (20.99) 23 (28.40) 5 (6.17) 28 (34.57) 8 (9.88) 
Logbook Reporting (n = 81) 
Logbooks are 
easy to fill out 
1 (1.23) 10 (12.35) 8 (9.88) 48 (59.26) 14 (17.28) 
I fill out my 
logbook 
accurately 
3 (3.70) 12 (14.81) 8 (9.88) 40 (49.38) 18 (22.22) 
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Support for MA Program (n = 81) 
I fully support 
MA in the long 
run 









11 (13.58) 15 (18.52) 10 (12.35) 38 (46.91) 7 (8.64) 
I spend less time 
fishing now 
7 (8.64) 32 (39.51) 9 (11.11) 31 (38.27) 2 (2.47) 
My catch has 
improved under 
MA 





Figure 4. 4: Perceptions of fishers towards Managed Access program-specific components, from 
respondents in 2019 only (n = 81). Responses were broken into three categories: (A) 











CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
Global fisheries provide livelihoods and fish protein for billions of people annually (FAO 
2014), yet they are incredibly challenging to sustainably manage (Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 
2009, Urquhart et al. 2014, Levine and Richmond 2015). To prevent overfishing and manage 
common-pool resource system (CPRS) problems that result from such challenges, community-
based fisheries management (CBFM) has emerged, particularly in small-scale fisheries contexts. 
These strategies incorporate traditional fisheries management techniques — like establishing 
marine protected areas (MPAs), monitoring catch per unit effort (CPUE), reporting maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY) and setting catch limits (Gaines et al. 2010, Valdés-Pizzini et al. 2012, 
Bonaldo et al. 2017, Chirico et al. 2017) — with increased participation by fishers in the 
monitoring and decision-making processes. An emerging CBFM strategy is the combination of 
catch share programs with territorial user rights for fishing (TURFs), which provide a way for 
fishers to contribute to resource monitoring (Islam and Yew 2013, Kittinger 2013, Barner et al. 
2015, Alexander et al. 2015). Through these programs, fishers are granted rights to fish in select 
areas but they have to report their catch to management officials. Belize was the first country in 
the Caribbean to implement such a program, naming it Managed Access (MA, Foley 2012, 
Belize Fisheries Department 2015 and 2019, Fujita et al. 2017). My dissertation research applied 
Ostrom’s social-ecological systems (SES) framework to evaluating the evolution of this 
program, and marine resource management in Belize more broadly (Ostrom 2007 and 2009). The 
results from my dissertation contribute to the growing peer-reviewed literature about CBFM 
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efficacy, which will be used to improve science-based management decisions in small-scale 
fisheries.  
In Chapter two, I combined review of secondary data, key informant interviews and 
participant observation to describe and evaluate the Governance System (i.e. institutions) 
involved in marine resource management in Belize. I found that the governmental, NGO, tourism 
and fishers institutions exhibit a polycentric, decentralized, and nested structure, which 
contributes to the potential for this system to be robust and resilient to future shocks 
(Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2018). Chapter two also revealed that marine resource management in 
Belize represents all eight design principles for long-enduring common pool resource systems 
(CPRS, Ostrom 1990), including clearly defined boundaries, collective-choice arrangements, and 
graduated sanctions. This suggests that Belize has the potential to overcome the collective action 
problems associated with small-scale fisheries (Levine and Richmond 2015), and become a 
global leader in sustainable fisheries management.  
Chapter three builds upon the understanding of fisheries management in Belize by 
examining how the benthic assemblages of the Resource System, the Belize Mesoamerican 
Barrier Reef (BMBR), changed throughout two decades (1997 – 2016) of disturbances (e.g. 
storms, bleaching and disease). I found that mean coral cover significantly declined from 26% to 
11% while macroalgae cover significantly increased from 13% to 40%. There was a documented 
shift in benthic community composition between early (1997 – 2005) and late (2009 – 2016) 
sampling years. Furthermore, generalized linear mixed models indicated that hard coral, 
macroalgae, soft coral and sponge coral were negatively correlated with thermal stress 
anomalies, while higher human influence was a significant driver of lower sponge and soft coral 
cover. The changes in benthic community composition and cover are concordant with studies 
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throughout the Caribbean that document shifts in coral reef communities following disturbances, 
regardless of management status storms (McClanahan et al. 2001, Coelho & Manfrino 2007, 
Graham et al. 2008, 2015, McClanahan 2008, Muthiga 2009, Darling et al. 2010, Huntington et 
al. 2011, Toth et al. 2014, de Bakker et al. 2017). This chapter suggests an overall shortcoming 
of the BMBR MPA network in mitigating the degradation of benthic reef assemblages following 
decades of disturbances.  
To explore another component of the SES as it applies to marine resource management in 
Belize, I assessed how the knowledge, attitudes, and practices of fishers (the Actors in the SES) 
towards the MA program changed between 2014 and 2019 in Chapter four. Fishers from 10 
communities in southern Belize were interviewed in 2014 by the Belize Fisheries Department 
(Belize Fisheries Department 2015) and again by me in 2019. Fishers from both years 
understood the requirements for acquiring and renewing their licenses, but in 2019, significantly 
more understood the logbook reporting requirements and the benefits of having MA rights than 
in 2014. Quantitative questionnaires and key informant interviews from 2019 revealed that a lack 
of enforcement by fisheries officers and illegal fishing by non-licensed fishers are two obstacles 
to the overall success of the MA program. These results are concordant with another study of 
fisherfolk in Belize, which found that enforcement and illegal fishing activities were negatively 
perceived by fishers (Wade et al. 2017), indicating a need for improvement by policymakers. 
This interdisciplinary dissertation innovatively combines marine community ecology 
with the social sciences to inform marine resource management decisions. By drawing from 
multiple disciplines, my research provides holistic, science-based advice for sustaining fishers’ 
livelihoods while preserving marine resources. Throughout the process, I worked closely with 
natural resource managers and marine stakeholders to co-develop interdisciplinary research 
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questions and methodology, ultimately leading to long-lasting and practical conservation 
outcomes on the ground. This inter-institutional collaboration was essential for ensuring a 
practical application for this research and a platform to share the work with those it affects. 
While my dissertation is a case study of fisheries management in Belize, similar policies are 
being implemented in other small-scale fisheries contexts, including the Philippines and Cuba 
(EDF, personal communication). The results of my dissertation can directly improve the 
practices for those locations. It is important for me to share the lessons learned and methodology 
from Belize so the fisheries policies may improve for both the environment and those who rely 
on it for their livelihoods.   
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
A1. Supplemental Tables 
 
Table A3. 1: All site-related variables, including list of study sites and survey years. Latitude and 
longitude are expressed in decimal degrees. Protection refers to one of three of the following 
management regimes: (1) fully protected zones where only non-extractive activities were 
permitted (FP), (2) general-use zones with restrictions placed on certain gear types (GU), and (3) 
non-protected zones (NP), where fishing is not restricted (Cox et al. 2017). HII is included at the 
100 km, 75 km, 50 km, 25 km, and 10 km radii. Single asterisk indicates site where species-level 
cover data were not available. Double asterisk indicates site was surveyed each sampling year of 
the study.  
 










Alligator    Y Y -88.05115 17.1966 NP 186234 100838 37768 870 42 
Bacalar 
Chico** 
Y Y Y Y Y -87.82222 18.16282 FP 265863 113113 36727 5817 1304 
Calabash Y * Y  Y  -87.8197 17.26147 NP 124826 50174 4088 1944 402 
Gallows Reef Y * Y  Y Y -88.04255 17.49592 NP 222640 107300 41029 5359 368 
Goffs Caye Y * Y  Y  -88.0288 17.3519 NP 196845 100781 37581 2729 34 
Halfmoon 
Caye 
Y * Y  Y Y -87.54679 17.2056 FP 47605 3299 2480 32 32 
Hol Chan Y Y Y  Y -87.97238 17.86343 FP 270893 118928 39311 2213 373 
Mexico 
Rocks 
Y   Y Y -87.90382 17.98782 NP 266313 118363 32687 2793 1188 
Middle 
Caye** 
Y Y Y Y Y -87.8054 16.737 FP 82761 28341 100 4 NA 
Nicholas Y * Y  Y  -88.2559 16.1123 NP 387947 166189 28520 NA NA 
Pompian Y * Y  Y  -88.0891 16.3731 NP 228362 66688 9416 NA NA 
South of 
Middle Caye 
Y * Y  Y  -87.8287 16.7288 NP 87915 31021 432 4 NA 
South Water  Y  Y  -88.0776 16.8135 GU 150663 74522 30206 1409 14 
Southwest 
Caye 
Y  Y  Y -87.8461 16.7108 GU 92221 32447 1003 4 NA 
Tacklebox**  Y Y Y Y Y -87.9508 17.9106 NP 270394 120568 34625 2719 575 
Tobacco 
Caye 






Table A3. 2: Three metrics of thermal stress anomalies (TSA) at all study sites sampled more 
than one year over the duration of this study.  TSA is weekly SST minus the maximum weekly 
climatological SST. The frequency of TSA (“TSA_Freq”) is defined by the number of instances 
TSA was over 1 degree Celsius over the previous 52 weeks, the frequency of TSA between 
survey years (“TSA_Freq_btw_surveys”) is defined as the number of instances since the 
previous survey year that TSA was over 1 degree Celsius, and the accumulative TSA 
(“TSA_Freq_hist”) is represented by the number of times since the beginning of the dataset 
(1982) to survey year that TSA was over 1 degree Celsius. 
 
Site Year TSA_Freq TSA_Freq_hist TSA_Freq_btw_surveys 
Nicholas 1997 1 14 6 
Nicholas_Control 1997 1 14 6 
Pompian 1997 1 19 7 
Southwest_Caye 1997 0 9 3 
South_of_Middle_Caye 1997 0 9 3 
Middle_Caye 1997 0 13 4 
Glovers_Control 1997 1 11 4 
South_Water 1997 1 15 4 
Tobacco_Caye 1997 0 13 7 
Alligator 1997 1 9 4 
Halfmoon_Caye 1997 1 6 2 
Calabash 1997 0 24 9 
Goffs_Caye 1997 0 11 4 
Gallows_Reef 1997 1 16 6 
Chapel 1997 0 21 6 
Hol_Chan 1997 1 19 6 
Tacklebox 1997 1 27 7 
Mexico_Rocks 1997 0 7 4 
Bacalar_Chico 1997 2 14 7 
Nicholas 1999 5 20 5 
Nicholas_Control 1999 5 20 5 
Pompian 1999 5 25 5 
Southwest_Caye 1999 4 13 4 
South_of_Middle_Caye 1999 4 13 4 
Middle_Caye 1999 3 16 3 
Glovers_Control 1999 2 13 2 
South_Water 1999 3 18 3 
Tobacco_Caye 1999 4 17 4 
Alligator 1999 3 15 3 
Halfmoon_Caye 1999 2 8 2 
Calabash 1999 1 25 1 
Goffs_Caye 1999 3 15 3 
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Gallows_Reef 1999 2 20 2 
Chapel 1999 5 27 5 
Hol_Chan 1999 2 22 2 
Tacklebox 1999 5 33 5 
Mexico_Rocks 1999 3 12 3 
Bacalar_Chico 1999 4 19 4 
Nicholas 2005 0 28 6 
Nicholas_Control 2005 0 28 6 
Pompian 2005 0 31 3 
Southwest_Caye 2005 3 24 8 
South_of_Middle_Caye 2005 3 24 8 
Middle_Caye 2005 1 26 7 
Glovers_Control 2005 0 17 1 
South_Water 2005 0 26 5 
Tobacco_Caye 2005 0 25 6 
Alligator 2005 1 22 5 
Halfmoon_Caye 2005 1 18 6 
Calabash 2005 0 34 4 
Goffs_Caye 2005 1 19 3 
Gallows_Reef 2005 1 24 4 
Chapel 2005 5 38 10 
Hol_Chan 2005 2 28 6 
Tacklebox 2005 4 45 11 
Mexico_Rocks 2005 3 22 9 
Bacalar_Chico 2005 2 25 5 
Nicholas 2009 1 39 6 
Nicholas_Control 2009 1 39 6 
Pompian 2009 3 43 7 
Southwest_Caye 2009 1 36 8 
South_of_Middle_Caye 2009 1 36 8 
Middle_Caye 2009 1 37 6 
Glovers_Control 2009 1 28 8 
South_Water 2009 0 35 4 
Tobacco_Caye 2009 2 31 5 
Alligator 2009 5 33 6 
Halfmoon_Caye 2009 1 28 6 
Calabash 2009 4 42 5 
Goffs_Caye 2009 4 30 6 
Gallows_Reef 2009 2 37 5 
Chapel 2009 4 51 9 
Hol_Chan 2009 3 39 6 
Tacklebox 2009 4 56 5 
Mexico_Rocks 2009 4 31 5 
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Bacalar_Chico 2009 1 31 3 
Nicholas 2016 2 69 25 
Nicholas_Control 2016 2 69 25 
Pompian 2016 2 67 21 
Southwest_Caye 2016 2 59 20 
South_of_Middle_Caye 2016 2 59 20 
Middle_Caye 2016 2 60 20 
Glovers_Control 2016 2 47 15 
South_Water 2016 3 55 17 
Tobacco_Caye 2016 4 52 18 
Alligator 2016 2 52 14 
Halfmoon_Caye 2016 1 47 15 
Calabash 2016 3 54 10 
Goffs_Caye 2016 1 43 11 
Gallows_Reef 2016 0 57 16 
Chapel 2016 1 63 10 
Hol_Chan 2016 3 53 11 
Tacklebox 2016 5 72 13 
Mexico_Rocks 2016 0 40 5 





A2. Supplemental Figures 
 







Figure A3. 2: The frequency thermal stress anomalies (TSA_freq) for each survey year. 
TSA_Freq is defined by the number of instances TSA was over 1 degree Celsius over the 
previous 52 weeks on our study sites (points) along the BMBR, where TSA is the weekly SST 








Figure A3. 3: Multidimensional scaling (MDS) plot of the species-level data, color coded for 
Year. Points represent individual sampling years, connected by lines. The Bray-Curtis 
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FOLIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Hello, my name is  and I am working with fishing communities to assist them in 
the management of their resources. We are conducting a survey of fishers of Belize. We would 
very much appreciate your participation in this survey by answering a few questions about the 
coastal resources and its fisheries. Whatever information you provide will be kept strictly 
confidential and your name and answers will not be shown to or shared with any other person 
except for those people who are working on the survey. Your answers will help us inform for 
better management of fisheries resources. This survey will take about 30 minutes of your time. 
 
To participate you need to be a fisher and at least 16 years old. Are you? (IF NOT, STOP THE 
INTERVIEW HERE). 
 
Participation in this survey is voluntary and you can choose not to answer any individual question 
or all of the questions. However, your views are important to us and I hope  you will participate. 
May I begin the survey now? 
 
 




(1) If not, can you give me the reason why you prefer not to be interviewed    
 
Coordinator: 




Name of Community: 
 
 
Date (month/day/year):    
Survey period: 
Pre campaign (Baseline) - Campaign area Post-campaign - Campaign area 
 
Latin America, Belize/Guad11 Cohort 
Baseline Survey (2014) and Post-campaign Survey (2015) 
Section 1 
(BACKGROUND INFORMATION FILLED IN PRIOR TO THE SURVEY WITHOUT ASKING THE 
RESPONDENT) 
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THROUGHOUT THE SURVEY YOU'LL SEE QUESTIONS THAT ARE ACCOMPANIED BY 
INSTRUCTIONS WRITTEN IN UPPERCASE. FOLLOWING THESE INSTRUCTIONS WILL ALLOW YOU, 
THE ENUMERATOR, TO POSE THE QUESTIONS INA CORRECT AND UNBIASED MANNER. 
THEREFORE, PREVIOUS TO ASKING EACH QUESTION, PLEASE ENSURE TO CHECK FOR ANY 
ACCOMPANYING INSTRUCTION SO THE DELIVERY OF THIS SURVEY IS SUCCESSFUL. 
ALSO, IT IS RECOMMENDED TO NOT READ OUT LOUD THE SECTION NUMBERS AND TITLES. 





(2) How old are you? 
16 to 20 21 to 30 31 to 40 41 to 50 51 to 60 61 or older 
 
(3) How many persons live in your household? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 More than 5 
 
(4) What is your highest level of education completed? (ONLY CHOOSE ONE. IF 
RESPONDENT HAS NEVER BEEN TO SCHOOL AND/OR NEVER COMPLETED 
PRIMARY SCHOOL, PLEASE MARK "NO SCHOOL COMPLETED".) 
 
Primary school level 
Secondary school/high school  
Tertiary school/post-high school level  
Other: 
 
Trade/Vocational course  




(5) Where do you currently live when you are not fishing? (CHOOSE ONLY ONE) 
 
 
□ Sarteneja   □ Santa Clara/San Roman  □ Belize City 
□ Chunox   □ San Victor    □ Dangriga Town 
□ Copper Bank  □ Orange Walk Town   □ Hopkins 
□ Consejo   □ San Estevan    □ Riversdale 
□ Progresso   □ Guinea Grass   □ Seine Bight 
□ Ranchito   □ San Jose    □ Placencia  
□ Libertad   □ San Pablo    □ Mango Creek/Independence 
□ Caledonia   □ Trial Farm   
□ Monkey River  □ Concepcion    □ Carmelita   
□ Punta Negra   □ Buena Vista    □ San Pedro Town  
□ Punta Gorda   □ Corozol Town   □ Caye Caulker  
  □ Other: __________________ 
 
 
(6) Can you tell me what cultural group you belong to? (ONLY CHOOSE ONE) 









(7) Which of the following languages are you comfortable speaking? (RESPONDENT CAN 
CHOOSE AS MANY AS APPLY) 
Spanish Maya Garifuna Creole English 
 
 
(8) Which of the following languages are you comfortable reading? (RESPONDENT CAN 
CHOOSE AS MANY AS APPLY) 




Socioeconomic and Demographic Questions 
"To begin, I would like to ask you some questions about yourself" 
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(9) Which of the following languages are you comfortable listening? (RESPONDENT CAN 
CHOOSE AS MANY AS APPLY) 
Spanish Maya Garifuna Creole English 
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(10) What kind of fishing vessel do you own? 
Canoe/Dorey Kayak Skiff Sailboat None 
Other: 
 
(11) Of the marine product you catch, could you please indicate how much comes from inside marine 
reserves? (PLEASE CHOOSE ONLY ONE) 
 
1 to 20 percent comes 
from inside marine 
reserves 
21 to 40 percent comes 
from inside marine 
reserves 
41 to 60 percent comes 
from inside marine reserves  
 
61 to 80 percent comes 
from inside marine reserves 
81 to 100 percent comes 
from inside marine reserves  
 
 
I dont know/Not sure 
(12) In the map provided, can you indicate by drawing, in which area you conduct your fishing 
activities anytime of the year? (PLEASE ASK THE FISHER TO DRAW THIS AREA 
WITH A MARKER IN THE MAP PROVIDED.) 
(A) DON'T READ THIS QUESTION: Coordinators overlay the transparency with the 6 BFD fishing 
areas over the printed map marked by the respondent and indicate in the following list all the 
ones that are marked. 
Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Area 4 Area 5 Area 6 None 
 
(B) DON'T READ THIS QUESTION: Coordinators overlay the transparency with the marine 
reserves over the printed map marked by the respondent and indicate the marine reserves 
identified. 
Bacalar Chico (1) 
Hol Chan MR (2) 
Caye Caulker (3)  
Turneffe Atoll (4) 
Light House (5) 
Glovers Reef (6) 
South Water Caye (7) 
Gladden Spit/Silk (8) 
Port Honduras MR (9) 
Sapodilla Cayes MR (10) 
None 
(C) DON'T READ THIS QUESTION: After the survey coordinators fill out this question by 
overlaying the transparency with the fishing sectors over the printed map marked by the 
respondent and indicate the sectors identified: 
Area 4A Area 4B Area 5A Area 5B Area 6A Area 6B 
 
(13) Which months of the year do you spend most nights away from home fishing (either at sea or 

















Do not apply 
(14) Please indicate which of the following description best describes you. (ENUMERATORS FIRST 
READ OUT ALL OPTIONS BEFORE MARKING THE ANSWER) 
I currently hold a valid commercial fisherfolk license 
I held a valid commercial fisherfolk license but it expired  
I never held a commercial fisherfolk license. 
 
(15) Please indicate which of the following description best describes you. (ENUMERATORS FIRST 
READ OUT ALL OPTIONS BEFORE MARKING THE ANSWER) 
I currently hold a valid Managed Access license for Port Honduras 
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I held a valid Managed Access license for Port Honduras, but it has 
expired 
I never held a Managed Access license for Port Honduras 
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(16) Please indicate which of the following description best describes you. (ENUMERATORS FIRST 
READ OUT ALL OPTIONS BEFORE MARKING THE ANSWER) 
I currently hold a valid Managed Access license for Glover's Reef 
I held a valid Managed Access license for Glover's Reef, but it has expired  
I never held a Managed Access license for Glover's Reef 
 
 







Fish Trap/  
Fish pot 
Lobster Trap/Lobster Shade 
Longline  
Cast net  
Crab trap  
Free diving 







(18) On average, how much of your daily catch do you keep/consume for your family? 




more than half  
less than half 
None  
Don't know 




(19) When you are at sea, there are several ways to know what is happening on the 
mainland. For the list below mention how important each of the communications 













(B) Telephone/cell phone 
(D) Newspaper 
 
(F) NGO/Fisheries Department staff 
(G) How else would you get information when you are out at sea? 
 
(20) How often, when you are out at sea,do you listen to the radio? (IF RESPONDENT 
ANSWERS "NEVER" GO TO QUESTION 21) 
Never 
Up to 3 days a 
week 
4 to 6 days a week  
7 days a week 
Only on weekends 
(A) Radio 
(E) Letters from institutions (Hand outs from 
NGOs/organizations) 
Section 3 
Media Preferences and Trusted Sources 
(C) Conversations with fishers from other 
vessels 
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(A) When you are out at sea, at what time of the day do you most likely listen to the radio? 
Please indicate up to 2 times more than likely you will be listening to the radio. 
 
before 6:00 am 
6:00 am to 8:00 
a.m 
8:00 am to 12:00 a.m  
12:00pm to 4:00pm 
4:00p.m to 7:00 p.m  
After 7:00 p.m 
(B) If you listen to radio at sea, which two radio stations do you listen to the most? Please indicate 
two choices. 





More FM None 







(21) When you are out at sea, which cell phone company do you use? (IF THEY GIVE MORE THAN 
ONE ANSWERS THE ENUMERATOR SHOULD ASK WHICH ONE THEY USE MOST. 
AND ONLY MARK THAT ONE) 





(22) How often, when you are on the mainland,do you listen to the radio? (IF RESPONDENT 
ANSWERS "NEVER" GO TO QUESTION 23) 
Never 
Up to 3 days a 
week 
4 to 6 days a week  
7 days a week 
Only on weekends 
(A) When you are on the mainland, at what time of the day do you most likely listen to the radio? 
Please indicate up to 2 times more than likely you will be listening to the radio. 
before 6:00 am 
6:00 am to 8:00 
a.m 
8:00 am to 12:00 a.m  
12:00pm to 4:00pm 
4:00p.m to 7:00 p.m  
After 7:00 p.m 
(23) When you are on the mainland, which radio stations do you listen to? Please indicate up to two 
options only. 





More FM  
None 





(24) When you are on the mainland, which cell phone company do you use the most? Only choose 
one 
BTL SMART None 
Other: 
 
(25) When you are on the mainland, what radio programs do you listen to the most? Please indicate 
up to two options only. 
Morning Show Love FM 
Belize Watch 
Making Waves  
Other: 




















(27) What local television show do you prefer to watch? Please indicate up to two options only. 
Belize Watch  
Wake up Belize 
Love FM morning show 
Open Your Eyes 
Other: 
The Dickey Bradley Show  
Rise and Shine 
Seasonal Shows Developing Toledo 
Show 
None/I don't watch television
 
 






San Pedro Sun  
Placencia Breeze 




(29) Have you ever heard of Managed Access? IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERS "NO" OR "NOT 
SURE", GO TO QUESTION 32. 
Yes  No  Not sure 
 
(30) Do you know what are the requirements to obtain a Managed Access license? IF THE 
RESPONDENT ANSWERS "NO" OR "DO NOT KNOW", GO TO QUESTION 31. 
Yes No Not sure 
 
(A) If answered yes, can you please list these requirements to obtain a Managed Access license? 
(DO NOT READ THE ANSWERS. YOU CAN CHECK MORE THAN ONE OPTION.) 
Fill out socioeconomic form 
Be a holder of a valid fisherfolk license 
Be 18 years old or older 
Proof of Belizean 
citizenship  
Proof of residence 
Fill out MA application 
form  
Pay the license fee 
Show proof of landing product in 
Belize  
Have fished in the area at least 3 years 
before now 
(B) DON'T READ THIS QUESTION TO RESPONDENT. ENUMERATOR SHOULD 
INDICATE HOW MANY CORRECT ANSWERS RESPONDENT GAVE IN PREVIOUS 
QUESTION (30A) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
(31)  Do you know what are the terms for Managed Access license renewal? IF THE 
RESPONDENT ANSWERS "NO" OR "NOT SURE", GO TO QUESTION 32. 
Yes No Not sure 
 
(A) If answered yes, can you please list these terms to renew the Managed Access license? (DONT 
READ THE ANSWERS) 
Pay annual license fee 
Comply with fisheries rules and regulations  
Fish 6 times a year at a minimum in the area 
Report catch data 
Have less then 3 infractions with fisheries 
regulations 
Fill out socioeconomic form 
Be a holder of a valid fisherfolk license 
Proof of Belizean citizenship 
Show proof of landing product in Belize 
Section 4 
Establish Baselines for and Measure Change in Knowledge SMART Objectives 
138  
(B) DON'T READ THIS QUESTION TO RESPONDENT. ENUMERATOR SHOULD 
INDICATE HOW MANY CORRECT ANSWERS RESPONDENT GAVE IN PREVIOUS 
QUESTION (31A) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
(32) Are there benefits to having Managed Access rights? IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERS "NO" 
OR "NOT SURE/DO NOT KNOW", GO TO QUESTION 33. 
Yes No Not sure/Do not know 
 
(A) If yes, can you list the benefits of having managed access rights? (DO NOT READ THE 
ANSWERS. YOU CAN CHECK MORE THAN ONE OPTION.) 
Fewer fishers 
Fishermen will be partners in the decision- 
making process (Transparency in the 
process) 
Less rush to fish  
Improved 
enforcement 
Fishers have better control/ are more 
responsible over their fishing activities 
Other: 
Better communication and more partnership 
with fisheries department  
Ensure long-term fishing activity  
Help sustain the livelihoods of fishers  
Reduced illegal fishing 
Better planning of fishing trips 
Do not know/not sure 
 
 
(B) DON'T READ THIS QUESTION TO RESPONDENT. ENUMERATOR SHOULD 
INDICATE HOW MANY CORRECT ANSWERS RESPONDENT GAVE IN PREVIOUS 
QUESTION (32A) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 
(33) Are fishers required to submit the records of their catch to the Belize Fisheries 
Department? 
Yes No Not sure/Do not know 
 
(34) Are there benefits of reporting your catch? IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERS "NO" OR "DO 
NOT KNOW", GO TO QUESTION 35. 
Yes No Not sure/Do not know 
 
(A) If yes, can you list the benefits of reporting your catch? (DO NOT READ THE 
ANSWERS. YOU CAN CHECK MORE THEN ONE OPTION.) 
Make better resource management decisions 
Knowledge about species caught in the area 
Helps renew your Managed Access license  
Better planning of my fishing activity 
Other: 
Have record of production all year round  
Can be used to demonstrate loss in case of bad weather 
of disaster (e.g. hurricane) 
To know the status of the species over time  
Do not know/not sure 
 
 
(B) DON'T READ THIS QUESTION TO RESPONDENT. ENUMERATOR SHOULD 
INDICATE HOW MANY CORRECT ANSWERS RESPONDENT GAVE IN PREVIOUS 
QUESTION (34A) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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(35) Can you please indicate your level of willingness to apply for a managed access license? 
Very low Low Medium High Very high N/A 
 
(36) Can you please indicate your level of willingness to fish in a designated number of marine 
reserves? 
Very low Low Medium High Very high N/A 
 
(37) Can you please indicate your level of willingness to report your catch data? 
Very low Low Medium High Very high N/A 
 
(38) Over the past 12 months, have you spoken with another fisher about the requirements to obtain a 
managed access license? 
Yes No Not sure/Do not know 
 
(39) Over the past 12 months, have you spoken to other fishers about the benefits of Managed Access? 
 
Yes No Not sure/Do not know 
 
(40) Over the past 12 months, have you spoken to another fisher about the benefits of reporting catch 
data? 
Yes No Not sure/Do not know 
(41) To which of the following kind of fisheries organizations do you belong? (ENUMERATORS FIRST 
READ OUT ALL OPTIONS BEFORE MARKING THE ANSWER. YOU CAN CHECK MORE 











Establish Baselines for and Measure Change in Attitude SMART Objectives 
Section 6 
Establish Baselines for and Measure Change in Interpersonal Communication SMART 
Objectives 
Section 7 
Establish Baselines for and Measure Change in Barrier Removal SMART Objectives 
Please rate your agreement with the following statements on a scale from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree. 
140  
(42) Over the past 12 months the Belize Fisheries Department's licensing system has become more 
efficient. 
Strongly Agree  
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree Disagree  
Strongly disagree 
Don't know/Don't have 
opinion 
 
(43) Managed Access rights have been distributed fairly to fishers. 
Strongly Agree  
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree Disagree  
Strongly disagree 
Don't know/Don't have 
opinion 
(44) The fishers in my community have the ability to locate the boundaries of the existing marine 
reserves. 
Strongly Agree  
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree Disagree  
Strongly disagree 




(45) How comfortable do you feel with correctly filling out a fisheries log book? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(46) Which of the following options best describes you? Over the past 12 months: 
I have never considered applying for a managed access license  
I am considering applying for a managed access license 
I intend to apply for a managed access license 
I intend to apply for a managed access license and I have discussed my intention to apply for a managed 
access license with someone. 
I have applied for a managed access license at least once  
I have renewed my managed access license 
 
(47) Which of the following options best describes you? Over the past 12 months: 
I have never considered only fishing in a designated number of marine reserves 
 I am considering to only fish in a designated number of marine reserves 
I intend to fish only in a designated number of marine reserves 
I intend to fish only in a designated number of marine reserves and I have talked to someone about my 
intention to fish only in a designated number of marine reserves. 
I currently fish in a designated number of marine reserves 
 
(48) Which of the following options best describes you? Over the past 12 months: 
I have never considered reporting catch data  
I am considering reporting catch data 
I intend to report catch data 
I intend to report catch data and I have talked to 
someone about my intention to report catch data. 
I am currently reporting catch data 
 
 
Please answer the following question on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1=to no extent, 5=to some 
extent and 10=to a great extent. 
Section 9 
Exposure to Campaign Activities & Messages 
Section 8 




Yes  No Do not know 
 
(B) Radio spots 
 
(D) Community meetings, forums, workshops 
(F) Song on radio 
 
(H) Mascot 




(50) For you, what marine species represents best your fishing activity? DON'T READ THE 





Sea Cucumber  
Shark 
Crab 
Goliath Grouper  
Dog Snapper  
Mutton Snapper 







(49) I am going to ask you about a number of ways in which you may or may not have seen or 
heard about Managed Access. For each method, I would like you to tell me whether you 
remember seeing or hearing that source in the past 12 months. 
(C) Posters 
(G) Speech/Talk by Respected Official 
(K) Brochures 
Now I am going to ask you a few general questions about your household and community. 
Please answer them as honestly and accurately as possible. Your answers will remain 
confidential. 
(A) TV advertisement in a local cable 
(E) Festivals 
(I) T-shirt with message 
(M) Billboards 
Section 10 
Social Impact Questions 
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(51) Which of these statements best describes the food eaten in your household in the last 12 months? 
We always had enough food to feed everyone in the household. 
We sometimes did not have enough food to feed everyone in the household.  
We often did not have enough food to feed everyone in the household. 
We never had enough food to feed everyone in the household. 
Refuse to answer 
 
(52) Have you or someone in your household participated in Managed Acces events and or activities? 
Yes No Don't know/Unsure Refused to answer 
(53) All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life these days? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Refused to answer 
(54) The fishers in my community have the ability to sustainably manage our fishery so that we can 
benefit from it long into the future. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Refused to answer 
 
 
(55) Most fishers in my community will follow the rules and regulations set forth for our 
fisheries. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Refused to answer 
 
 
(56) Generally speaking, most fishers in my community can be trusted. 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree  
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree  
Refused to answer 
 
(57) It is not difficult for myself and members of my family to find job as is needed to provide for the 
home. 
Strongly Agree  
Agree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree  
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree  
Refused to answer 
 
(58) My family is able to benefit from our fishery as much as any other members of the 
community. 
Strongly Agree  
Agree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree  
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree  
Refused to answer
Please answer the following question on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1=completely dissastisfied 
and 10=completely satisfied. 
Please answer the following question on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1=to no extent, 5=to some 
extent and 10=to a great extent. 







Thank you for all of your help in responding to this anonymous questionnaire survey. Your 
answers will remain confidential. I look forward to keeping in contact with you. 
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A2. 2019 Survey Instrument 
 
SCRIPT FOR ENUMERATOR: 
 
Hello, my name is ______(SAY YOUR NAME)___________ and I am working with Catherine 
Alves at the University of North Carolina to conduct a survey of fishers in Belize. We are 
working with fishing communities to assist them in the management of their resources. We hope 
to evaluate how participation in the zonation of fisheries has affected your livelihood and 
perceptions. We would very much appreciate your participation in this survey by answering a 
few questions about the coastal resources and its fisheries.  
 
Whatever information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and your name and answers 
will not be shown or shared with any other person except for those people who are working on 
the survey. Your answers will help us inform better management of fisheries resources. This 
survey will take about 30 minutes of your time. Participation in this survey is voluntary and you 
can choose not to answer any question or all of the questions. However, your views are important 
to us and I hope you will participate.  
 
To participate you need to be a licensed commercial fisher in 2019 and at least 18 years old. Are 
you? (IF NOT, STOP THE INTERVIEW HERE) May I begin the survey now? (BEGIN THE 
SURVEY BY GETTING THEIR VERBAL CONSENT – THEY MUST SAY “YES” ALOUD) 
 





SECTION 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION FILLED IN PRIOR TO SURVEY 




Name of Community: ___________________________________________________________ 
 
Date (month/day/year): _________________________________________________________ 
 
Time (00:00 hr:min): ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Gender of Respondent:  □ Male □ Female □ Other 
 
 
SECTION 2: FISHING BEHAVIOR/ACTIVITIES 
“To begin, I’m going to ask you about your fishing behavior and activities related to fishing.” 
 
 
2.) How many years have you been fishing? 
145  
 
□ 0 – 5  □ 6 – 10 □ 11 – 15  □ 16 – 20 □ 21 – 25 □ 26 or more 
 
3.) How many generations in your family have been fishing?  
 
□ One (mine)   □ Two   □ Three  □ Four  □ Five or 
more 
 
4.)  What is your role on the vessel? 
 
□ Boat Owner   □ Captain  □ Crew Member/Deck Hand  □ 
Cook 
□ Solo fishers    □ Other: __________________________ 
 
5.) What type of fishing vessel do you use? 
 
□ Canoe/Dorey □ Kayak □ Skiff  □ Sailboat □ None 
□ Other: ______________________________________ 
 
6.) Which of the following fishing methods do you engage in? (MAY SELECT MORE 
THAN ONE) 
 
□ Handline  □ Speargun   □ Longline  □ Beach trap 
□ Seine  □ Fish Trap/Fish Pot  □ Cast net  □ Hawaiian sling 
□ Gillnet  □ Lobster Trap   □ Crab trap   
□ Hookstick  □ Lobster Shade  □ Free diving 
□ Other: ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.) On average, how many days long are your fishing trips?  
 
□ 0 – 5 days  □ 6 – 10 days  □ 11 – 15 days □ 16 – 20 days 
□ 21 – 25 days □ 26 – 30 days □ 31 days or more  
 
8.) On average, for each season listed, how many trips do you make each month? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 or 
more 
Conch  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  





o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 





10.) Which of the following catch options do you primarily target?  
(DON’T READ THE ANSWERS, MAY PROVIDE MORE THAN ONE) 
 
□ Conch  □ Sea Cucumber  □ Grouper   □ Snapper  
□ Lobster  □ Shark   □ Crab    □ Jacks 
□ Red Hind  □ Spanish Mackerel  □ Mullet    □ Barracuda 
□ Other: ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
11.) What is the average number of pounds of each of the following that you catch in a 
fishing trip? (SKIP LOGIC: ONLY BASED OFF OF ANSWERS IN Q11) 
□ Conch: _____ □ Sea Cucumber: _____ □ Grouper: _____ □ Snapper: _____  
□ Lobster: _____ □ Shark: _____  □ Crab: _____  □ Jacks: _____ 
□ Red Hind: _____ □ Spanish Mackerel: _____ □ Mullet: _____ □ Barracuda: _____ 
□ Other: ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
12.) What is the average market value of the following catch options? (SKIP LOGIC: 
ONLY BASED OFF OF ANSWERS IN Q11) 
□ Conch: _____ □ Sea Cucumber: _____ □ Grouper: _____ □ Snapper: _____  
□ Lobster: _____ □ Shark: _____  □ Crab: _____  □ Jacks: _____ 
□ Red Hind: _____ □ Spanish Mackerel: _____ □ Mullet: _____ □ Barracuda: _____ 
□ Other: ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
13.) What percentage of your total catch per year is caught inside a marine reserve? 
(PLEASE CHOOSE ONLY ONE) 
 
□ 1 – 20 percent   □ 41 – 60 percent  □ 81 – 100 percent 
□ 21 – 40 percent  □ 61 – 80 percent  □ I don’t know/not sure 
 
14.) On average, how much of your daily catch do you keep/consume for your family? 
(CHOOSE ONLY ONE) 
 
□ All   □ More than half  □ None  □ Refused to answer 
□ Half   □ Less than half  □ Don’t know 
□ Other: ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
15.) Where do you sell your product? (HAVE RESPONDENT INDICATE PERCENT OF 
PRODUCT SOLD AT EACH SECTOR AND PUT A CHECK IN THE 
CORRESPONDING BOX). 
 
 0% 1 – 25% 25 – 50% 50 – 75% 75 – 100 % 










o  o  o  o  o  
Own Use o  o  o  o  o  
Other: o  o  o  o  o  
 
16.) To which of the following kind of fisheries organizations do you belong? 
(ENUMERATORS, FIRST READ OUT ALL OPTIONS BEFORE MARKING THE 
ANSWER. YOU MAY SELECT MORE THAN ONE OPTION). 
 
□ Cooperative   □ Belize Fishermen Cooperative Association 
□ Fisheries Association □ None 
□ Other: ______________________________________________________________________ 
□ Specify Cooperative: __________________________________________________________ 
 
17.) For which Managed Access area(s) do you have a commercial fishing license? 
(SELECT ALL THAT MAY APPLY.) 
□ Area 1  □ Area 2 □ Area 3 □ Area 4 □ Area 5 □ Area 6 




SECTION 3: PERCEPTIONS 
“Thank you for your responses. I will now ask you your opinions about several fisheries-related 
issues.” 
 
18.) Do you know what the requirements are to obtain a Managed Access license? 
□ Yes  □ No  □ Not Sure 
 
A. If answered Yes, can you please list these requirements? (DO NOT READ THE 
ANSWERS. YOU CAN CHECK MORE THAN ONE OPTION). 
□ Fill out socioeconomic form   □ Fill out MA application form 
□ Be a holder of a valid fisherfolk license  □ Pay the license fee 
□ Be 18 years old or older   □ Show proof of landing product in Belize 
□ Proof of Belizean citizenship   □ Proof of residence 
□ Have fished in the area at least 3 years before now 
 
B. DO NOT READ THIS QUESTION. DATA PROCESSING WILL PROVIDE 
NUMBER OF CORRECT ANSWER(S) RESPONDENT GAVE IN PREVIOUS 
QUESTION 
□ 0  □ 1  □ 2 □ 3  □ 4 □ 5 □ 6  □ 7  □ 8 □ 9 
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19). Do you know what are the terms for Managed Access license renewal? (IF THE 
RESPONDENT ANSWERS “NO” OR “NOT SURE,” ADVANCE TO NEXT 
QUESTION). 
 
□ Yes  □ No  □ Not Sure 
A. If answered Yes, can you please list these terms to renew the Managed Access 
license? (DO NOT READ THE ANSWERS YOU CAN CHECK MORE THAN 
ONE OPTION). 
□ Pay the annual license fee   
□ Comply with fisheries rules and regulations 
□ Fish 6 times a year at a minimum in the area 
□ Report catch data 
□ Have less than 3 infractions with fisheries regulations 
□ Fill out socioeconomic form 
□ Be a holder of a valid fisher folk license  
□ Proof of Belizean citizenship 
□ Show proof of landing product in Belize 
 
B. DO NOT READ THIS QUESTION. DATA PROCESSING WILL PROVIDE 
NUMBER OF CORRECT ANSWER(S) RESPONDENT GAVE IN PREVIOUS 
QUESTION 
 
□ 0  □ 1  □ 2 □ 3  □ 4 □ 5 □ 6  □ 7  □ 8 □ 9 
 
20.) Are there benefits to having Managed Access rights? (IF THE RESPONDENT 
ANSWERS “NO” OR “NOT SURE,” ADVANCE TO NEXT QUESTION). 
 
□ Yes  □ No  □ Not Sure 
A. If Yes, can you list the benefits of having Managed Access rights? (DO NOT READ 
THE ANSWERS. YOU CAN CHECK MORE THAN ONE OPTION). 
 
□ Fewer fishers 
□ Fishermen will be partners in the decision-making process (transparency in the process) 
□ Less rush to fish 
□ Improved enforcement 
□ Fishers have better control/are more responsible over their fishing activities 
□ Better communication and more partnership with Fisheries Department 
□ Ensure long-term fishing activity 
□ Help sustain the livelihoods of fishers 
□ Reduced illegal fishing 
□ Better planning of fishing trips 
□ Do not know/Not sure 
□ Other: ________________________________________________________________ 
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B. DO NOT READ THIS QUESTION. DATA PROCESSING WILL PROVIDE 
NUMBER OF CORRECT ANSWER(S) RESPONDENT GAVE IN PREVIOUS 
QUESTION 
□ 0  □ 1  □ 2 □ 3  □ 4 □ 5 □ 6  □ 7  □ 8 □ 9 
 
21.) Are fishers required to submit the records of their catch to the Belize Fisheries 
Department?  
□ Yes  □ No  □ Not Sure 
 
22.) Are there benefits of reporting your catch? (IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERS 
“NO” OR “DO NOT KNOW,” ADVANCE TO NEXT QUESTION). 
□ Yes  □ No  □ Not Sure 
 
A. If yes, can you list the benefits of reporting your catch? (DO NOT READ THE 
ANSWERS. YOU CAN CHECK MORE THAN ONE OPTION).  
□ Make better resource management decisions 
□ Knowledge about species caught in the area 
□ Helps renew your Managed Access license 
□ Better planning of my fishing activity 
□ Have record of production all year round 
□ Can be used to demonstrate loss in case of bad weather or disaster (e.g. hurricane) 
□ To know the status of the species over time 
□ Do not know/Not sure 
□ Other: ________________________________________________________________ 
 
B. DO NOT READ THIS QUESTION. DATA PROCESSING WILL PROVIDE 
NUMBER OF CORRECT ANSWER(S) RESPONDENT GAVE IN PREVIOUS 
QUESTION  
 
□ 0  □ 1  □ 2 □ 3  □ 4 □ 5 □ 6  □ 7  □ 8 □ 9 
 
23.) Have you or someone in your household participated in Managed Access events and/or 
activities? 
 
□ Yes   □ No   □ Don’t know/Unsure  □ Refused to answer 
 
□ If Yes, how many? ______________ □ If Yes, why? ___________________ 
□ If No, why not? ________________ 
 
24.) How often does your Managed Access Committee representative provide you with 
feedback?  
 
□ Never  □ Seldom  □ Sometimes  □ Often  □ Unsure 
 







































o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
















in the marine 
reserves has 
declined 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
29.) Logbooks are 
easy to fill out 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  




o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
31.) I spend less 
time fishing 
now that I am 
a part of 
Managed 
Access 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  




o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
33.) Managed 
Access rights 






34.) The fishers in 
my 
community 





o  o  o  o  o  o  o  






fishery so that 
we can benefit 
from it long 
into the future 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  















can be trusted 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
38.) I have seen 
fishers fishing 
in areas where 
they don’t 
have a license 





o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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40.) I fully support 
Managed 
Access in the 
long run 




SECTION 4: DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC QUESTIONS 
“Thank you for your responses. Now, I would like to ask you some questions about yourself.” 
 
41.) How old are you? 
□ 18 – 20  □ 21 – 30  □ 31 – 40 □ 41 – 50 □ 51 – 60 □ 61 or older 
 
42.) How many persons live in your household? 
 
□ 0  □ 1  □ 2  □ 3  □ 4  □ 5  □ More than 5 
 
43.) What is your highest level of education completed? (ONLY CHOOSE ONE. IF 
RESPONDENT HAS NEVER BEEN TO SCHOOL AND/OR NEVER COMPLETED 
PRIMARY SCHOOL, PLEASE MARK “NO SCHOOL COMPLETED”.) 
 
□ Primary school level    □ Trade/Vocational course 
□ Secondary school/high school level □ No school completed 
□ Tertiary school/post-high school level □ Other: __________________________________ 
 
44.) Where do you currently live when you are not fishing: (CHOOSE ONLY ONE) 
 
□ Sarteneja   □ Santa Clara/San Roman  □ Belize City 
□ Chunox   □ San Victor    □ Dangriga Town 
□ Copper Bank  □ Orange Walk Town   □ Hopkins 
□ Consejo   □ San Estevan    □ Riversdale 
□ Progresso   □ Guinea Grass   □ Seine Bight 
□ Ranchito   □ San Jose    □ Placencia  
□ Libertad   □ San Pablo    □ Mango 
Creek/Independence  □ Caledonia    □ Trial Farm   
□ Monkey River  □ Concepcion    □ Carmelita   
□ Punta Negra   □ Buena Vista    □ San Pedro Town  
□ Punta Gorda   □ Corozol Town   □ Caye Caulker  
  □ Other: __________________ 
 
45.) Can you tell me what cultural group you belong to? (CHOOSE ONLY ONE) 
 
□ Mestizo  □ Garifuna  □ Creole  
□ Maya  □ East Indian  □ Other: ______________________ 
 
46.) What percentage of your annual income comes from fishing? 
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□ 1 – 20%  □ 21 – 40 %   □ 41 – 60 %  □ 61 – 80 %  □ 81 – 100%  
 
47.) Are you involved in any other income generating activities other than fishing? 
□ Yes  □ No  □ If yes, what? (options: Tour guide, SCUBA, Farming, 
Construction, Teacher, Retail, Other) 
 
48.) Are there other members in your household involved in an income generating activity? 
 
□ Yes  □ No  □ If yes, what? (same options as Q47) 
□ If yes whom? (options: Mother, Father, Sister, Brother, Daughter, Son, Other)  
 
49.) Do you own your home? 
 
□ Yes  □ No 
 
50.) Does your dwelling have any of the following? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY) 
 
□ Toilet     □ Shower/bath 
□ Running Water   □ Electricity 
□ Kitchen     □ Computer  
□ Telephone/cell phone  □ Television 
□ Washing Machine   □ Refrigerator 
□ Stove     □ Land-based motor vehicle (includes motorcycles) 
□ WiFi     □ Pool        
□ Other: _________________________ 
 
51.) (DO NOT READ) What language was the survey conducted in today? 
□ English  □ Garifuna  □ Kriol 
□ Ketchi  □ Spanish  □ Other: ______________________ 
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